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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953 & Supp. 2000). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly grant defendants' Motion to Dismiss the 
association's tort claims based on the economic loss rule? [R. 33-34; 48-49; 77-81; 
116-18.] 
2. Did the trial court properly grant Snow Flower, Ltd.'s, ("Snow Flower") and 
Jack W. Davis, Inc.'s ("Davis") (collectively referred to as "defendants") Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Snow Flower Homeowners Association's ("Association") breach of 
contract claims on the grounds that there were no express or implied warranties between 
the parties? [R. 213-214.] 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Utah Court of Appeals reviews a trial court's grant 
of summary judgment or of dismissal for "correctness." E.g. Harline v. Baker, 912 P.2d 
433, 438 (Utah 1996); Country Oaks Condominium Management Committee v. lones, 
851 P.2d 640, 641 (Utah 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. OR RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, or regulations 
that are determinative or central to the issues on appeal. Although the Association cites 
the Utah Condominium Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-1, et seq. (2000), as determinative, 
that reliance is misplaced. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The Association filed this action on January 14, 1998 against Snow Flower and its 
general partner, Davis. As its causes of action, the Association alleged: (1) strict 
liability; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) negligence; (4) breach of implied warranty of 
quality; and (5) breach of implied warranty of fitness. [R. 1-14.] The allegations of the 
Complaint were based upon construction defects purportedly found in the late 1990s 
during a renovation of the Snow Flower Condominiums, which were constructed some 
20 years earlier in the late 1970s. [R. 158 at 1 4.] 
On June 11, 1998, the defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss in response to the 
Association's Complaint. [R. 20-21.] The Motion to Dismiss asserted that the 
Association had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because it had 
not alleged personal bodily injury or physical property damage in connection with its 
tort claims and had failed to allege contractual privity with respect to its contract claims. 
[R. 45-56.] After full briefing on the issues, on December 1, 1998, Judge Pat B. Brian 
dismissed the tort claims for strict liability and negligence. [R. 117-18.]1 Litigation then 
commenced with respect to the Association's contract claims for breach of express and 
implied warranties. 
On October 18, 1999, the defendants brought a Motion for Summary Judgment 
on the Association's remaining contract claims. [R. 141-42.] The defendants asserted 
*A copy of Judge Brian's Amended Order on Motion to Dismiss is included in the 
appendix to this brief as Attachment " 1 . " 
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that because discovery had failed to reveal any express warranties of quality or fitness, 
and because there was no contractual privity between the Association and either Snow 
Flower or Davis, defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [R. 141-54.] 
On March 17, 2000, after full briefing and argument, Judge Robert K. Hilder granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all remaining claims and entered a 
Final Judgment dismissing the Complaint. [R. 212-19.]2 This appeal followed. 
2. Statement of Relevant Facts. 
The Snow Flower condominium units were sold by Snow Flower to individual 
owners in 1978 and 1979. [R. 158 at 1 3.] Jack W. Davis, Inc. did not enter into any of 
these agreements, but merely executed them as general partner of Snow Flower. [R. 158 
at tH 5, 7.] The sales were evidenced by warranty deeds, earnest money contracts, and, 
in some instances, real estate contracts. [R. 158 at H 6.] None of these documents 
contain any express warranties as to quality or fitness and the Association has been 
unable to come forward with any such written warranties. [R. 158 at f 8.] Furthermore, 
neither Davis nor Snow Flower made any oral warranties concerning the quality of the 
condominiums. [R. 157 at t 1 12, 13, 15.] The Association was not a party to any of the 
purchase agreements. [R. 156-59.] Rather, the agreements were between the individual 
condominium owners and Snow Flower. [R. 158 at f 5.] As of the time of this 
2A copy of Judge Hilder's Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the Final Judgment dismissing the Complaint are included in the appendix to this 
brief as Attachment "2." 
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litigation, most of the original owners had resold their units to third parties who have no 
contractual privity with Snow Flower. [R. 156-57 at 1 14.]3 
The Association was created in 1978 as part of the original development of the 
Snow Flower Condominium project. [R. 179 at % 3.] The current owners of the 
individual units are members of the Association. [R. 179 at 1 4.] Approximately twenty 
years after the original construction, the Association undertook remodeling efforts. [R. 
178-79 at 1f 5.] The Association contends that the costs of remodeling were increased 
because of alleged latent defects in the original construction 20 years earlier. [R. 178.] 
Because the damages alleged do not encompass bodily injury or damage to 
property, the tort claims of negligence and strict liability were properly dismissed. 
Likewise, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the contract 
claims both because there are no warranties contained in the agreements or otherwise. 
Consequently, the decisions of the trial court should be upheld. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Tort Claims Were Properly Dismissed. 
Utah has adopted the majority view that tort claims cannot be supported by an 
allegation of purely economic damages. The Association seeks the recovery of purely 
economic losses - the increased expenses it allegedly incurred during remodeling. As a 
result, the claims of strict liability and negligence are not supported by a claim of injury 
3As of the date of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, there were 13 original 
purchasers who still owned condominiums at the Snow Flower project. [R. 156-57 at 
114. ] 
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compensable in non-intentional tort. Recognizing that deficiency, Judge Brian correctly 
dismissed the tort claims. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed. 
2. Defendants Were Entitled to Summary ludgment on the Contract 
Claims. 
The Association has alleged three causes of action based on breach of warranty: 
(1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty of quality; and (3) breach 
of implied warranty of fitness. Each of these claims must fail as a matter of law. 
(a) Express Warranty Claims. 
A claim for express warranty must be asserted by a party to the contract in 
which the warranty is contained. Thus, there can be no express warranty 
between Snow Flower and any of the subsequent purchasers as a matter of law. 
Furthermore, because there is nothing in the agreements entered into between 
Snow Flower and the original purchasers that warrants either the quality or fitness 
of the units, the claim for breach of express warranty must also fail. Therefore, 
Judge Hilder's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
claim for breach of express warranty should be affirmed. 
(b) Implied Warranty Claims. 
As with an express warranty, an implied warranty can only exist between 
parties to the agreement. Even where that relationship does exist, however, the 
Utah Supreme Court has rejected the type of claims advanced by the Association. 
The Utah Supreme Court has refused to imply a warranty of habitability in favor 
of the purchasers of condominium units. In the absence of such implied 
warranty, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ASSOCIATION'S CLAIMS 
FOR STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE. 
The Association alleged that Davis and Snow Flower were liable under theories of 
strict liability and negligence for the economic losses allegedly incurred by latent defects 
in the original construction of the condominiums in the late 1970s. Both of these tort 
claims are barred by the economic loss rule and were properly dismissed by the trial 
court. That rule requires that all non-intentional torts be accompanied with a claim of 
personal injury or damage to property. 
A. A Claim in Non-Intentional Tort Cannot be Based Solely on Economic 
Loss. 
In East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 868-75; 
106 S.Ct. 2295, 2300-04 (1986), the United States Supreme Court adopted the economic 
loss rule in admiralty cases. The East River court explained: 
Exercising traditional discretion in admiralty, . . . we adopt an approach similar 
to Seely, and hold that a manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no 
duty under either a negligence or strict products-liability theory to prevent a 
product from injuring itself. "The distinction that the law has drawn between 
tort recovery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic loss is 
not arbitrary and does not rest on the luck ' of one plaintiff in having an 
accident causing physical injury. The distinction rests, rather, on the 
responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in distributing his products/' 
Seely v. White Motor Co., 68 Cal.2d, at 18, 45 Cal.Rptr., at 23, 403 P.2d [145, 
151 (1965)]. When a product injures only itself the reasons for imposing a tort 
duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual remedies are 
strong. 
476 U.S. at 871; 106 S.Ct. at 2302 (footnote and citations omitted; emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the economic loss rule in the context of a case 
nearly identical to the instant case - a home owners association's claim for latent 
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construction defects. See American Towers Owners v. CCI Mechanical, 930 P.2d 1182 
(Utah 1996).4 In American Towers, the home owners association sued a group of 
defendants claiming that the plumbing and mechanical systems at the condominium 
project were defectively designed and installed. The complaint sought recovery for 
unjust enrichment, breach of warranty, breach of implied warranty, and negligence. 930 
P.2d at 1184. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of defendants on all counts. The claim for negligence failed because 
the home owners association could point to no personal injury or damage to property 
caused by the alleged construction defects. In adopting the economic loss rule, the 
American Towers court explained: 
The policy reasons supporting the economic loss rule are sound. When a 
product does not perform or last as long as the consumer thinks it should, the 
claim pertains to the quality of the product as measured by the buyer's and 
user's expectations-expectations which emanate solely from the purchase 
transaction. Thus, contract principles resolve issues when the product does not 
meet the user's expectations, while tort principles resolve issues when the 
product is unsafe to person or property. 
930 P.2d at 1190 (emphasis added). See also, Cathco, Inc. v. Valentiner Crane Brunies 
Onvon Architects, 944 P.2d 365, 368 (Utah 1997) (American Towers cited and 
followed). Applying the economic loss rule, the American Towers court concluded that 
the home owners association had failed to come forward with facts that could support a 
claim for negligence. Consequently, the American Towers court affirmed the trial court's 
order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
4Because the facts of American Towers closely parallel those now at issue, a copy of 
that decision is included as Attachment "3" in the appendix to this brief. 
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That same result is appropriate here. The alleged damages claimed by the 
Association are "nothing more than disappointed expectations." American Towers, 930 
P.2d at 1191. As such, they are governed by the laws of contract and not of tort There 
are no damages alleged that could support the tort requirement of "injury to person or 
property." American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1190. Thus, the trial court properly dismissed 
the negligence and strict liability causes of action for failure to state a claim upon which 
relief could be granted. 
Furthermore, the Association's attempt to distinguish American Towers is not 
persuasive. Contrary to the Association's assertion, the Utah Supreme Court did not limit 
its holding adopting the economic loss rule to "claims against remote parties." [Brief of 
the Association at p. 17.] Indeed, the American Towers court specifically found the 
construction arena to be a setting in which the distinction between tort and contract 
claims should be enforced. 
The Association argues that applying the economic loss rule in construction 
cases rewards builders who construct defective housing and wrongly focuses 
on the consequences of the defective activity instead of on the activity itself. 
We disagree. Builders who construct low quality housing that does not cause 
injury to persons or property may still be held liable for damages, but that 
liability should be defined by the contract between the parties. The law of 
torts imposes no standards on the parties' performance of the contract; the only 
standards are those agreed upon by the parties. Tort law is concerned only 
with the safety of a product or an action. 
930 P.2d at 1190 (emphasis added). 
This analysis is equally applicable to the developer of the project. In reliance on 
this analysis, the American Towers decision affirmed the entry of summary judgment in 
favor of American Towers, Inc., the original developer of the project. 930 P.2d at 1184. 
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Moreover, the American Towers decision expressly recognized the role of the 
"developer" in the typical condominium transaction: 
IA1 developer can contract for low-grade materials that meet only minimum 
requirements of the building code. When the developer sells those units, a 
buyer should not be able to turn around and sue the builder for the poor 
quality of construction. Presumably the buyer received what he paid for or he 
can bring a contract claim against his s e l l e r . . . . Meanwhile, if the developer 
has a problem with the builder, he too wil l have a contract remedy. A buyer 
can avoid economic loss resulting from defective construction by obtaining a 
thorough inspection of the property prior to purchase and then either obtaining 
insurance or by negotiating a warranty or reduction in price to reflect the risk 
of any hidden defects. . . . 
930 P.2d at 1190-91 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly adopted the majority rule5 that claims in tort 
must be supported by an allegation of non-economic damages. No such damages have 
been alleged by the Association and the trial court properly granted summary judgment 
as a matter of law for the defendants on the negligence and strict liability claims. That 
judgment should be upheld. 
B. The Facts Alleged Do Not Support a Claim for Strict Liability. 
In Ernest W. Hahn. Inc. v. Armco Steel. 601 P.2d 152, 158 (Utah 1979), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the Restatement of Torts definition of strict liability. The 
Restatement Rule states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous 
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical 
harm thereby caused to the ultimate consumer, or to his property . . . . 
5American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189 (recognizing economic loss rule as majority 
position). 
9 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) (emphasis added). The definition of strict 
liability adopted by the Utah Supreme Court incorporates the economic loss rule by 
limiting liability to "physical harm." As has been discussed above, there is no allegation 
in this case of any physical harm to the Association or its property. Rather, the strict 
liability claim is based on the allegation that the Association has suffered solely 
economic loss. Consequently, the strict liability claim was properly rejected on the 
defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, the Restatement definition of strict liability limits its application to one 
who sells "any product" in a defective and unreasonably dangerous condition. The Utah 
Supreme Court distinguished between a claim based on a defective product and one 
based on defective construction in American Towers. The home owners association in 
American Towers relied upon a plurality decision from the Utah Supreme Court, W.R.H., 
Inc. v. Economy Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981), for the proposition that 
non-economic damages could support a claim for negligence. In W.R.H., the issue was 
whether a claim for negligent manufacture of the siding used in the construction of a 
residence could survive absent any claim for personal injury or property damage. 
Although the W.R.H. majority upheld the claim, the more recent American Towers 
decision, a unanimous pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court, casts serious doubt 
upon the precedential validity of W.R.H. where the claims arise out of allegedly 
negligent construction. The American Towers court noted that: 
W.R.H. has not been followed in subsequent cases. Instead, it has been 
distinguished as a case that addressed only the negligent manufacturing of a 
product. See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 
1286 (Utah 1982) (limiting W.R.H. to negligent manufacturing of product); 
10 
n.10 Maack [v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1994)] at 581 (W.R.H. "not controlling" because it involved "negligent 
manufacture" of product rather than "negligent construction" of building); 
Schafir [v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)] at 1388 (same); see 
also Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214, 217-18 n.3 (Utah 
1984) (this court has never blended tort and contract concepts to allow 
products liability for purely economic injuries). Here, the Association alleges 
negligent design and construction of improvements to real property, not the 
negligent manufacture of a product. Thus, we conclude that W.R.H. does not 
apply to this case. 
930 P.2d at 1189-90 (emphasis added). 
As in American Towers, the claims in this action are for negligent construction of 
the condominium project and not for negligent manufacture of a product used in 
construction. Thus, the claim does not involve the sale of a defective "product," a 
necessary element of any strict liability claim. Because the Association has alleged no 
damages other than economic losses and because the claim does not involve the sale of 
a defective product, the strict liability claim was properly dismissed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE ASSOCIATION'S CLAIMS FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT. 
In addition to its tort claims, the Association alleged that the defendants were liable 
for breach of express and implied warranty. Because contractual privity is an essential 
element of any warranty claim and because no express or implied warranties exist, the 
trial court properly granted defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. That summary 
judgment decision should be affirmed by this court. 
A. There Is No Express Warranty in the Documents Between Snow Flower 
and the Original Condominium Purchasers. 
The breach of express warranty claim was alleged on the basis of "information and 
belief" that defendants warranted the "quality, safety, and fitness" of the units. [See 
11 
Complaint % 21 (R. 9).] The Association, however, was unable to support that allegation 
with any facts. To the contrary, the sales were effectuated by earnest money agreements, 
warranty deeds, and, in many instances, real estate contracts, none of which contains 
any express warranty of quality, safety, or fitness. [R. 158, 184-86.] 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase ("Earnest Money") used in some 
of the sales is a standard form agreement which states: 
It is understood and agreed that terms written in this receipt constitute the 
entire Preliminary Contract between the purchaser and the seller, and that no 
verbal statement made by anyone relative to this transaction shall be construed 
to be part of this transaction unless incorporated in writing herein. It is further 
agreed that execution of the final contract shall abrogate this Earnest Money 
Receipt and Offer to Purchase. 
Earnest Money at p. 1 (emphasis added) [R. 186].6 The form then contains a typed 
express covenant which states: 
Seller unconditionally covenants that it wi l l complete the construction of the 
applicable unit and all parts of the common areas and limited common areas of 
the Snow Flower Condominiums within 2 years of the date of Seller's 
acceptance hereof. 
id. There are no other express covenants or warranties in the Earnest Money Agreement. 
Thus, pursuant to the merger clause quoted above, no such express representations, 
promises, or warranties existed. 
Similarly, the Real Estate Contract used in certain of the sales specifically disclaims 
any such warranties: 
It is hereby expressly understood and agreed by the parties hereto that the 
Buyer accepts the said property in its present condition and that there are no 
6A copy of a typical Earnest Money agreement between Snow Flower and a 
purchaser is included in the appendix as Attachment "4." 
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representations, covenants, or agreements between the parties hereto with 
reference to said property except as herein specifically set forth or attached 
hereto none . 
Uniform Real Estate Contract at 1 20 [R. 184].7 The paragraph contains a line where 
any representation, including warranties, could be identified. That line contains the 
word "none" typed on the document. ]d. 
In an attempt to avoid this language and the absence of any express warranties, the 
Association relies on a convoluted sequence of incorporations by reference for its 
argument that the sale documents contained express warranties. The Association relies 
on the property description in the Warranty Deeds, which refer to the Condominium 
Declaration and Record of Survey Map, which, in turn, allegedly incorporate the Utah 
Condominium Act in its entirety. [See Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment at p. 6 ("SJ Opp.") [R. 175.]] The language of the Warranty Deed 
describes the number of the condominium unit being conveyed and then includes, as 
part of the property description, the following language: 
together with a [%] undivided ownership interest in the common areas and 
facilities according to the Condominium Declaration and Record of Survey Map 
recorded September 25, 1978 as Entry No/s 149678 and 149679, respectively, 
in the office of the Summit County Recorder. 
(SJ Opp. at p. 6 [R. 175].) Because the Warranty Deeds refer to the Declaration and 
Record of Survey Map, the Association claims that the deeds somehow incorporated by 
reference an express warranty of quality, fitness, and safety. (See SJ Opp. at pp. 6-8 
[R. 173-75]; Association Brief at p. 13.) This argument must fail for several reasons. 
7
 A copy of a typical Real Estate Contract between Snow Flower and a purchaser is 
included in the appendix as Attachment "5." 
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First, the Utah Condominium Act clearly articulates both the purpose and effect of 
describing in a deed the condominium unit by reference to the recorded Declaration and 
Record of Survey Map: 
Every deed, lease, mortgage or other instrument may legally describe a unit by 
its identifying number or symbol as designated in the declaration or as shown 
on the record of survey map, and every such description shall be deemed to 
convey, transfer, encumber or otherwise effect the unit owner's corresponding 
percentage of ownership in the common areas and facilities even though the 
same is not expressly mentioned or described. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-8-14 (2000) (emphasis added). In other words, a reference in the 
deed to the Declaration or Record of Survey Map merely serves to legally describe the 
unit and corresponding common area being conveyed. There is nothing in the Utah 
Condominium Act that even remotely suggests that warranties of quality, fitness, or safety 
arise from a reference to the Declaration or Record of Survey Map for the legal 
description of the property conveyed.8 
Second, the notion that a warranty deed includes warranties of quality, fitness, or 
safety is inconsistent with the Utah legislature's definition of a Warranty Deed. Under 
Utah law, a Warranty Deed warrants: (1) that grantor is lawfully seized of the premises; 
(2) that grantor has good right to convey the premises; (3) that grantor guarantees the 
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession of the premises; (4) that the 
8The use of a reference to a recorded plat for a legal description was well-established 
in Utah prior to the adoption of the Utah Condominium Act. See, e.g., Hall v. North 
Qgden Citv, 109 Utah 304, 175 P.2d 703 (1946) ("Where there is a recorded plat, the 
conveyance of land by designation of lot number and block number and name of plat or 
subdivision passes title of the grantors the same as if such lots had been described by 
metes and bounds."). Consequently, there is no basis whatsoever to argue that a legal 
description that refers to a recorded map has anything to do with warranties of quality, 
fitness, and safety. 
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premises are free from all encumbrances; and (5) that the grantor, his heirs and personal 
representatives wi l l forever warrant and defend the title thereto in the grantee, his heirs 
and assigns against all lawful claims whatsoever. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (2000). If 
the Utah legislature had intended that a warranty deed would extend beyond covenants 
of title to include a warranty of quality, fitness, or safety of the premises, it could have 
done so. 
Third, Utah does not judicially impose any warranty of quality on a seller. Instead 
it adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor or buyer beware. E.g., Schafir v. Harrigan, 
879 P.2d 1384, 1388-89 (Utah App. 1994); Maack v. Resource Design & Construction. 
inc., 875 P.2d 570, 582-83 (Utah App. 1994). That doctrine recognizes that the buyer 
and seller each have bargaining power and that a buyer can insist on inspections or 
terms if it is concerned about the quality of the property. There is nothing contained in 
the recorded Declaration or Survey Map described in the Warranty Deeds that would 
create any reason for abandoning the traditional principles of Utah law.9 
Finally, the Condominium Act itself does not create any warranties of quality, 
fitness, or safety. The Association asserts that the Declaration, by stating that the 
provisions of the Utah Condominium Act shall apply to the project, created an express 
warranty of compliance with the Utah Condominium Act. (See Sj Opp. at 7 [R. 174]; 
Association brief at pp. 10-11.) In turn, the Association concludes that such compliance 
9The portion of the Declaration for the Snow Flower Condominiums relied upon by 
the Association is included in the appendix as Attachment "6." The Record of Survey 
map is included as Attachment "7," It is apparent from a review of these documents that 
they are designed to establish and describe the condominium project, not to create 
warranties of quality running in favor of all future purchasers of the units. 
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includes a warranty to all future purchasers of compliance with building codes and 
regulations. 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Brickyard Homeowners' Association 
Management Committee v. Gibbons Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Condominium Act was adopted to allow this new type of property interest to qualify for 
mortgage loans and insurance. 668 P.2d at 536-37. The Act does not purport to create 
warranties in every sales transaction regarding the condition of the condominium unit. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-8-1, et seq. (2000). The provision upon which the 
Association relies simply indicates that no condominium project shall be "permitted" 
which does not comply with local ordinances and codes. ]d. § 57-8-35(2). The section 
then goes on to provide that local governments may adopt ordinances for the permitting 
and approval of condominium projects. ]d. § 57-8-35(3) & (4). The Condominium Act's 
provision for local government land use regulation of condominium projects and its 
affirmation that condominiums are not exempt from compliance with applicable building 
codes does not remotely suggest an express warranty of quality from sellers to 
purchasers. If the legislature had intended to create such an express warranty, in direct 
contravention of the established rule of caveat emptor, it could have done so in plain 
terms. The fact that the Condominium Act does not exempt condominiums from local 
regulation does not evidence a legislative intent to create a special warranty for 
purchasers of this particular type of real property interest. 
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The Association has come forward with no evidence which could support a claim 
for breach of express warranty. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants and that decision should be affirmed. 
B. There Is No Implied Warranty. 
The Association also asserts that the defendants have breached implied warranties of 
quality and fitness. These claims were easily disposed of by the trial court by application 
of the Utah Supreme Court's recent decision in American Towers. The home owners 
association in American Towers sued for breach of an implied covenant of habitability. 
930 P.2d at 1193. The Utah Supreme Court refused to extend this implied covenant 
beyond the landlord tenant context, stating: 
The Association contends that condominium purchasers are especially 
susceptible to latent defects and do not have a feasible opportunity to conduct 
an inspection. We disagree. The condominium buyer, like the home buyer, is 
investing in the ownership of a residence rather than making rental payments 
for a transient dwelling. The buyer has the incentive and the means to inspect 
the unit before purchase. 
930 P.2d at 1194 (emphasis added). Based on this analysis, the American Towers court 
refused to imply a warranty of habitability into a condominium purchase agreement. 
Likewise, the Association's claims against the defendants for breach of implied 
warranties of fitness and quality were properly dismissed. In support of its implied 
warranty claims, the Association relies on Strathmore Riverside Villas Condominium 
Association v. Paver Development Corp., 369 S.2d 971 (Fla. App. 1979). Simply stated, 
the Florida Court of Appeals decision is not controlling in this jurisdiction. Utah adheres 
to a view of real estate law which requires buyers to exercise judgment and discretion in 
their purchase decisions. 'The terms of a contract for the sale of a residence are much 
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more open to negotiation than a rental contract because the buyer and seller have similar 
bargaining power. If the seller refuses to accede to an express warranty, nothing 
prevents the buyer from halting negotiations and looking elsewhere. Tenants often do 
not have that luxury and are more prone to take what they can get." American Towers, 
930 P.2d at 1193-94; see also, Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 
570, 582-83 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).10 
CONCLUSION 
The Association has alleged only economic loss. Therefore, the trial court was 
correct in dismissing the negligence and strict liability claims asserted by the Association. 
That decision should be affirmed by this court. 
Likewise, the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment to defendants 
on the breach of express and implied warranty claims should be affirmed. The 
Association failed to come forward with any evidence of a single, express warranty either 
written or oral. The Association's attempt to incorporate a provision of the Utah 
Condominium Act that merely indicates that condominium projects should not be 
permitted if they do not meet code also fails. Indeed, if the reference to a survey map or 
10Furthermore, even in Florida, there must be contractual privity between the 
claimant and the defendant before a claim for breach of implied warranty wi l l lie. E.g., 
Strath more, 369 So.2d at 973 (Fla. Ct. App. 1979); Parliament Towers Condominium v. 
Parliament House Realty, Inc., 377 So.2d 976 (Fla. App. 1979). In Strathmore, the case 
upon which the Association relies, the Florida Court of Appeals refused to extend 
implied warranties beyond the original purchasers. 369 So.2d at 973. That holding was 
followed by another panel of the Florida Court of Appeals in Parliament Towers, 377 
So.2d at 978. Thus, even if Utah were one of the states, like Florida, that has adopted 
implied warranties of fitness or compliance with code in the sale of condominiums, 
those warranties could not be asserted by anyone other than the original purchasers. 
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a condominium declaration could create such express warranties, virtually every deed in 
which the legal description refers to a map or plat would become a warranty of the 
quality of the property. This result would be contrary to real estate law in the State of 
Utah and would eliminate the rule of caveat emptor. 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has expressly refused to extend implied 
warranties of habitability into the sale arena. Rather, the American Towers court 
reaffirmed this state's adherence to a rule that recognizes the bargaining power held by a 
potential purchaser. The trial court correctly applied Utah law and its judgment 
dismissing the Association's Complaint should be affirmed on all counts. 
DATED this ^ 3 -day of October, 2000. 
PARR WADDQUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
By: 
Ronald G./Russell, Esq. 
Attorneys for Appellees/Defendants 
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I hereby certify that on the ^b>"~day of October, 2000 two true and correct 
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Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Key Bank Tower, Seventh Floor 
50 South Main Street 
P O. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465 
Telephone- (801) 531-2000 
Fax No.: (801) 532-5506 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SNOW FLOWER HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
| AMENDED ORDER ON 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 
vs. I 
SNOW FLOWER, LTD , JACK W. DAVIS, Civil No. 980600012 
INC., a California corporation, and DOES 1 J 
through 100, Judge Pat Brian 
Defendants. ! 
Whereas the above-entitled Court has received and reviewed the parties' 
supplemental memoranda with regard to plaintiffs objections to the Court's prior Order, and the 
parties hereto, by and through their respective counsel of record, having stipulated to the terms of 
this Order, now therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED as follows: 
A. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby granted as to the First and 
Third Causes of Action. The Court finds the said Causes of Action sound in tort, not contract, and 
are barred by the Economic Loss Rule. 
BOOK C C C PAGE 1 6 1 0113 
B. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be and is hereby denied as to plaintiffs 
Second, Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action. However, all defenses with regard to these claims are 
reserved. 
C. Nothing herein shall be construed as a waiver or discharge of any right of 
appeal on the part of any party. 
DATED this / day of N & i ^ r , 1998. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
BY THR COURT: 
4L<*' 4 
THE HONORABLE PAT B 
Third Judicial District Cou; 
5.. % ~"Ar - ° = ;V7 &<? s 
"5", y-% /,, ^ ^ 
14164-001/224685 
CG 162 OUT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Amended Order on 
Motion to Dismiss was mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this Q day of H&rGmSev, 1998, 
to the following: 
Robert F. Babcock 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
57 West South Temple 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
{ i ^ i ll* oi&tijU: 
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Tab 2 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Brett J. Swanson, Esq. (7641) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
No.. F I L E D 
MAR 1 7 2000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SNOW FLOWER HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SNOW FLOWER, LTD., JACK W. 
DAVIS, INC., a California corporation, 
and DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980600012 
This matter came before the court for oral argument on Wednesday, February 16, 
2000, on defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Snow Flower 
Homeowners Association was represented by Robert F. Babcock. Defendants Snow 
Flower, Ltd. and Jack W. Davis, Inc. were represented by Ronald G. Russell and Brett J. 
Swanson. 
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UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Based on the record herein, the court finds that the following facts are undisputed 
for purposes of defendants7 summary judgment motion: 
1. In or about 1978 and 1979, defendant Snow Flower, Ltd. contracted for the 
construction of the Snow Flower Condominiums. 
2. The condominiums, which consist of two separate buildings, were 
constructed in or about 1979. 
3. Snow Flower, Ltd. sold individual units of the condominiums to original 
purchasers pursuant to earnest money agreements and uniform real estate contracts. The 
earnest money agreements and uniform real estate contracts relating to the sales were 
identical to those attached as exhibits to the Affidavit of Jack Davis so far as any 
warranties are concerned. 
4. None of the earnest money agreements or uniform real estate contracts 
contained any express warranties relating to construction defects or deficiencies. 
5. Title to the units was conveyed by Snow Flower, Ltd. to the original 
condominium purchasers pursuant to warranty deeds which did not provide any express 
warranties againsl construction defects. 
6. The Snow Flower Condominiums were established pursuant to a 
condominium declaration recorded at the Summit County Recorder's office as Entry No. 
149679, in Book M120, at Page 274 and a three-page record of survey map recorded 
September 25, 1978 as Entry No. 149678. 
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7. The warranty deeds by which the condominium units were conveyed by 
Snow Flower, Ltd. to the original purchasers describe the units conveyed by reference to 
the condominium declaration and record of survey map. 
8. The Snow Flower Homeowners Association recently contracted for the 
remodel of certain portions of the condominium buildings. During the course of that 
remodeling project, plaintiff asserts that defects in the original 1979 construction of the 
buildings were discovered. In particular, plaintiff claims that there were violations of the 
1976 building code, which code was referenced in the original construction drawings 
and specifications dated March 30, 1978. 
9. The record of survey map is a separate and different document from the 
construction drawing, plans and specifications. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, including the court's review of the 
earnest money agreements, uniform real estate contracts, and warranty deeds used in the 
conveyances to the original condominium purchasers, the court makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. There are no express warranties against construction defects in any agreement 
between Snow Flower, Ltd. and the original condominium purchasers. Consequently, 
there is no basis for a breach of warranty claim based on alleged construction defects 
under the earnest money agreements or the uniform real estate contracts. 
3
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2. The warranty deeds by which title was conveyed to the original 
condominium purchasers do not contain any express warranties against construction 
defects. The description of the unit conveyed in the warranty deed by reference to the 
condominium declaration and record of survey map does not express any warranties 
against construction defects, nor does it indicate an intent to create such warranties. The 
warranties provided by a warranty deed under Utah law are prescribed by statute and 
relate only to the title conveyed. See Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12. 
3. Neither the condominium declaration nor the record of survey map create 
contractual warranties between Snow Flower, Ltd. and the condominium purchasers. 
4. Utah adheres to the doctrine of caveat emptor and, in the absence of an 
express warranty in the contract documents between Snow Flower, Ltd. and the 
condominium purchasers, plaintiff's Second Cause of Action for breach of contract -
warranty fails as a matter of law. 
5. Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action for breach of 
implied warranties fail under the Utah Supreme Court's decision in American Towers 
Owners Ass'n Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996), and the 
reasoning set forth therein. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing and for the reasons set forth in defendants' memoranda 
supporting their summary judgment motion, 
BOOK GGGWW*11* 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is 
granted. Accordingly, the court wil l enter a final judgment dismissing the plaintiff's 
Complaint herein with prejudice and on the merits. 
, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
DATED this / 7 ""day of /)j#<«^As 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
hkJfToVabl^Robert ' j^^ i r ' " " " N & 
District Court Jud fsJ / SUMMiT \<£ 
!?A COUNTY / 5 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. of 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
Attorneys for PlaintL 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A. I hereby certify that on the _ 2 ^ f f a a y of February, 2000 a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Rona 
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NO.. 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
Brett J. Swanson, Esq. (7641) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
F I L E D 
MAR 1 7 2000 
Third District Court g_ | -
B y
"beputy^- Siiinmit counxy 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SNOW FLOWER HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SNOW FLOWER, LTD., JACK W. 
DAVIS, INC., a California corporation, 
and DOES 1 through 100, 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 980600012 
The court having dismissed plaintiff's First Cause of Action and Third Cause of 
Action pursuant to an order dated December 1, 1998, and having entered its Order 
Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to plaintiff's Second Cause of 
Action, Fourth Cause of Action, and Fifth Cause of Action, the court hereby enters its 
Final Judgment in this case. 
800KGGGPAGE213 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that plaintiff's Complaint 
be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice and on the merits 
DATED this / 7 " day of /bz '<3u*^eAs , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
a O . "t 
Hor r i b l e RoberTKTOTir 
District Court Judge f g : ^ f g 
1 5 \ COUNTY / ^ . 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. of 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
Attefffways for Plainti 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. of 
PARR/WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
BQOH. G & G ^ ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2 ^ day of February, 2000 a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
Brian J. Babcock, Esq. 
BABCOCK BOSTWICK SCOTT CRAWLEY & PRICE 
57 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
G. Russell, Esq. 
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AMERICAN TOWERS OWNERS ASSO-
CIATION, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
CCI MECHANICAL, INO, Christiansen 
Brothers, Inc., American Towers, Inc^ 
Trossen Wright Architects, PJL, Donald 
A. Wright, Duane A. Trossen, Block 58 
Associates, a limited partnership, Block 
Associates, Inc., Dee W. Christiansen, 
West Temple Associates, a limited part-
nership, CL Management Ltd., a limited 
partnership, Howard S. Clark, Estate of 
George A. Learning, MB Management, 
Inc., Daw Incorporated, Hunter Insula-
tion, Inc., First Security Bank of Utah, 
N.A., REH Incorporated, MCC Powers 
Process Controls, and Red-White Valve 
Corp., Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 950136. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 20, 1996. 
Condominium association sued "numer-
ous" defendants, alleging design and con-
struction defects in plumbing and mechanical 
systems of condominium complex. The 
Third District Court, Division I, J. Dennis 
Frederick, J., granted summary judgment 
for defendants and appeal was taken. The 
Supreme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) re-
lease given by association to lender which 
later became owner and developer, would not 
be set aside; (2) association was not third-
party beneficiary of contracts between owner 
and contractors; (3) association could not re-
cover economic damages when suing on neg-
ligence theory; (4) association could not main-
tain unjust enrichment claim; (5) there was 
no implied warranty of habitability; (6) law of 
case doctrine did not allow recovery from 
party against whom default judgment had 
been granted; and (7) trial court did not 
abuse discretion by denying request for con-
tinuance to allow association to pursue addi-
tional discovery. 
Affirmed. 
1. Release <®=>36 
Release given by condominium associa-
tion to lender, which had foreclosed and be-
come owner and developer, covering "all 
* * * claims * * * which arise out of or 
relate to the acquisition, foreclosure, manage-
ment, supervision, operation or contror of 
project by lender, precluded later claim that 
plumbing and ventilating equipment in build-
ings was defective, even though release did 
not include statement that claims of any na-
ture were covered, and release did not recite 
that lender had assumed role in construction 
and marketing of project 
2. Release <s=>16 
Release given by condominium associa-
tion to owner/developer of project would not 
be set aside on grounds of mutual mistake, 
after problems were discovered in plumbing 
and mechanical systems of buildings; as 
there had been thousands of dollars of re-
pairs made to those systems prior to execu-
tion of release, discoveries made after release 
represented unknown consequences of known 
injury, not covered by doctrine of mutual 
mistake, rather than damages unknown at 
time of release. 
3. Contracts <3=>187(1) 
Condominium association was not third-
party beneficiary of contracts and subcon-
tracts involving owner, contractor and sub-
contractors covering construction of condo-
minium complex; mere fact that buildings 
were to contain condominiums did not show 
necessary intent to confer benefits on associ-
ation. 
4. Damages <S=*39 
Condominium association claiming negli-
gent construction of condominium complex, 
together with negligent supervision, could 
not recover from contractor and subcontrac-
tors economic damages consisting of repair 
costs and diminution of property values; eco-
nomic damages could only be recovered on 
breach of contract theory, or through asser-
tion of intentional tort claim. 
5. Damages <3=>39 
Exception to rule precluding recovery of 
economic loss under negligence claim, allow-
ing compensation for damage to property 
other than property subjected to negligent 
AMERICAN TOWERS OWNERS v. CCI MECHANICAL Utah 1 1 8 3 
Cite as 930 P.2d 1182 (Utah 1996) 
treatment, did not allow recovery for dam-
ages to walls,, wall coverings, carpeting, wall 
hangings, curtains and other furnishing of 
condominium complex, allegedly caused by 
negligence in installation of plumbing pipes; 
entire complex was one indivisible unit of 
property, damage to which constituted non-
compensable economic loss, 
6- Implied and Constructive Contracts <&=>3 
Before unjust enrichment may serve as 
a basis of recovery, there must be benefit 
conferred on one person by another; appreci-
ation or knowledge by conferee of benefit; 
and acceptance or retention by conferee of 
benefit under such circumstances as to make 
it inequitable for conferee to retain benefit 
without payment of its value, 
7, Implied and Constructive Contracts 
<S=>3,55 
If legal remedy is available, such as 
breach of express contract, law will not imply 
equitable remedy of unjust enrichment 
8, Implied and Constructive Contracts 
Condominium association could not 
maintain unjust enrichment action against 
contractor and subcontractors who had built 
condominium complex, seeking to recover 
damages for defective plumbing and pipe 
work; subject matter of suit was covered by 
express contract between owner and contrac* 
tor, thus precluding unjust enrichment 
claims. 
9. Contracts <§=>205.35(3) 
There was no implied warranty of habit-
ability deemed made to purchasers of condo-
miniums, of sort deemed made by landlords 
to tenants; prospective condominium owners 
had opportunity to check condition of premis-
es unavailable to tenants. 
10. Courts <s=*99(6) 
Law of case doctrine did not require 
trial court, to allow condominium association 
suing for damages caused by defective 
plumbing and piping in condominium pro-
jects to recover millions of dollars against 
defendant which had not answered complaint 
and against which default judgment had been 
entered; case had gone forward against other 
defendants and recovery had been disallowed 
on all theories. 
1L Judgment e=>186 
While party's request for continuance to 
conduct additional discovery is to be liberally 
considered, such motions may be properly 
denied in summary judgment proceedings 
when they are found to be lacking in merit. 
Rules CivJProc, Rule 56(f). 
12. Judgment <3=>186 
Trial court did not abuse discretion by 
declining to allow condominium association 
suing contractors who had built condominium 
complex continuance to conduct additional 
discovery before entering summary judg-
ment against it; court had ruled as matter of 
law that association did not state any claims 
against contractors, and under those circum-
stances facts developed through additional 
discovery would not change results. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(f). 
Craig G. Adamson, Eric P. Lee, Cameron 
S. Denning, Salt Lake City, for American 
Towers Owners Association. 
John L. Young, Salt Lake City, for CCI 
Mechanical. 
George A Hunt, Kurt M. Frankenburg, 
Reed L. Martineau, John R. Lund, Julianne 
Blanch, Salt Lake City, for Christiansen 
Brothers, Block 58 Associates, Dee W, Chris-
tiansen. 
Raymond Scott Berry, Salt Lake City, for 
American Towers, Inc. 
Karra J. Porter, Geoffrey C. Haslam, Salt 
Lake City, for Trossen Wright Architects, 
Duane Trossen, Donald Wright. 
Terry M. Plant, Bradley R. Helsten, Salt 
Lake City, for West Temple Associates, 
Howard Clark, CL Management Ltd., Estate 
of George Learning, MB Management. 
Tim Dalton Dunn, J. Rand Hirschi, Salt 
Lake City, for Daw Incorporated. 
Merrill F. Nelson, Gregory M. Simonsen, 
Salt Lake City, for Hunter Insulation, Red-
White Valve Corp. 
Jonathan A Dibble, Keith A Kelly, Salt 
Lake City, for First Security Bank, REH 
Incorporated. 
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Harold L. Petersen, Salt Lake City, for 
MCC Powers Process Controls, Mark Con-
trols Corporation. 
Craig C. Coburn, Bret M. Hanna, Salt 
Lake City, for amicus Consulting Engineers 
Council, amicus Utah Society of American 
Institute of Architects, 
HOWE, Justice: 
Plaintiff American Towers Owners Associ-
ation, Inc. (the Association), brought this ac-
tion against numerous defendants, alleging 
design and construction defects in the plumb-
ing and mechanical systems of a large condo-
minium -complex. The district court granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment, 
and the Association appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
In reviewing this grant of summary judg-
ment, we view the facts in the light most 
favorable to the Association and recite them 
accordingly. The American Towers complex 
consists of two 26-story towers containing 
357 residential units and some commercial 
space. Architectural services for the com-
plex commenced in 1980, and a general con-
tractor was hired in 1981. The complex was 
substantially completed in July 1983. 
Defendants were all involved in the com-
plex's design, development, and construction. 
CCI Mechanical, Inc. (CCI), was the com-
plex's mechanical subcontractor and engineer 
and was responsible for the planning and 
installation of the culinary water, sewer, 
heating, cooling, and fire protection systems. 
Christiansen Brothers, Inc., was the general 
contractor. American Towers, Inc., was the 
original developer and was one of the original 
borrowers on the complex's construction 
loan. Trossen Wright Architects, PJL, Don-
ald A. Wright, and Duane A. Trossen were 
the architects. Block 58 Associates, Block 
1. The parties share multiple intersecting business 
relationships. For example, Dee W. Christiansen 
was the president of American Towers, Inc., a 
general partner in Block 58 Associates, and a 
vice president of Christiansen Brothers, Inc. 
West Temple Associates, on the other hand, was 
a limited partner in Block 58 Associates and a 
shareholder in Block Associates, Inc. 
2. Defendants Red-White Valve Corp. and MCC 
Powers Process Controls, also called Mark Con-
trols Corp., have been dismissed from this action. 
3. In September 1991, the Association filed a 
complaint against CCI Mechanical, Inc. In June 
Associates, Inc., Dee W. Christiansen, West 
Temple Associates, CL Management, Ltd., 
Howard S. Clark, the late George A. Learn-
ing, and MB Management, Inc., were all 
involved in the development and/or financing 
of the complex.1 Daw Incorporated was the 
dry wall subcontractor. Hunter Insulation, 
Inc., was the insulation subcontractor. First 
Security Bank of Utah, N JL, and its wholly 
owned subsidiary REH Inc., foreclosed its 
security interest in 1984 and became a suc-
cessor developer of the complex.2 
The Association's second amended com-
plaint3 sought damages for uiyust enrich-
ment, breach of contract/warranty (third-par-
ty beneficiary), negligence, and breach of 
implied warranty.4 The allegations generally 
concern problems with the complex's plumb-
ing and mechanical systems. For example, 
instead of using premanufactured T-shaped 
joints at the ninety degree plumbing connec-
tions, builders fabricated the joints on site. 
These joints were allegedly incorrectly made, 
resulting in thin walls that are inherently 
weaker than standard premanufactured 
joints. These weak joints began to progres-
sively spring leaks in late 1990 as the com-
plex reached full occupancy. Other problems 
include (1) piping systems that were installed 
without adequate provision for expansion and 
contraction and without sufficient guides and 
anchors, resulting in pipe breaks and leaks, 
(2) pipes that are too small in some locations, 
resulting in pressure loss and failures, (3) 
domestic water system pressure that exceeds 
the code limit at some fixtures, and (4) lack 
of outside air vents and exhaust systems. 
First Security filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint which the district court treated as 
1992, the Association filed an amended com-
plaint, clarifying the original complaint and add-
ing a breach of warranty claim. In July 1993, 
the Association filed a second amended com-
plaint, adding the nineteen other defendants and 
a products liability claim. 
4. The complaint also asserted claims of conver-
sion and products liability. The Association did 
not pursue the conversion claim before the dis-
trict court and does not do so on appeal. The 
products liability claim applied only to MCC 
Powers Process Controls, which was dismissed 
from this action 
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a motion for summary judgment. The court 
granted the motion, concluding that First 
Security entered into a May 1989 release 
with the Association that covered the claims 
asserted in the complaint and that the re-
lease was not subject to rescission on the 
basis of mutual mistake. 
Most of the remaining defendants moved 
for summary judgment beginning in May 
1994. In response, the Association moved 
for a continuance under rule 56(f) of the 
Utah Rutes of Civil Procedure, on which 
motion the court apparently did not rule. In 
July 1994, the Association filed a second rule 
56(f) motion. 
The district court conducted a hearing in 
August 1994, denied the Association's rule 
56(f) motion, and granted all of the summary 
judgment motions, concluding that (1) the 
unjust enrichment claim fails because the 
subject matter of the claim was preempted 
by the existence of express contracts and 
because the Association conferred no benefit 
upon defendants, (2) the third-party benefi-
ciary claim fails because the Association was 
not an intended beneficiary, (3) the negli-
gence claim fails because the alleged dam-
ages are for economic loss, not for injury to 
persons or other property, (4) the implied 
warranty of habitability claim fails because 
Utah does not recognize such a claim in this 
circumstance, (5) all of the Association's 
claims accrued more than six years prior to 
the commencement of this action and are 
time-barred, and (6) the discovery rule does 
not apply to toll the running of the statute of 
limitations.5 
Following the court's decision, Hunter In-
sulation, Inc., and American Towers, Inc., 
moved for summary judgment The court 
granted the motions on the same basis as the 
prior motions. 
5. The court also held that the claims against 
West Temple Associates, Howard S. Clark, Estate 
of George A. Learning, CL Management, Ltd., 
and MB Management, Inc. (collectively, the West 
Temple defendants), 
fail as a matter of law due to the fact that the 
West Temple defendants were not the actual 
owners or developers of the American Towers 
project, but were either shareholders or limit-
ed partners in the entities that did own and/or 
develop the project- By virtue of the protec-
tion afforded shareholders by the principles 
associated with the corporate veil or by opera-
The sole remaining defendant, Block Asso-
ciates, Inc., did not respond to the second 
amended complaint. Consequently, the As-
sociation moved for entry of default judg-
ment. The district court directed entry of 
Block Associates' default but denied the re-
quest for a money judgment, holding that 
granting one would be inconsistent with the 
court's prior holdings in the case. 
On review of a grant of summary judg-
ment, we will affirm only if there is no genu-
ine dispute of material fact and the moving 
parly is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. Andreini u Hultgren, 860 P.2d 916, 
918 (Utah 1993). 
FIRST SECURITY & REH 
We first address the district court's grant 
of summary judgment to First Security and 
its wholly owned subsidiary REH (collective-
ly, "First Security") on a basis unique from 
the other defendants. The court held that 
(1) First Security entered into a release with 
the Association that covered the claims as-
serted in the complaint, and (2) the release is 
not subject to rescission on the basis of mu-
tual mistake. These are questions of law 
that we will review for correctness. 
In 1983, First Security provided financing 
for the complex under a participation agree-
ment with American Savings, the original 
lender on American Towers. In 1984, First 
Security foreclosed its security interest and 
took ownership of American Towers. In 
1987, the Association sued First Security, 
claiming that it owed unpaid assessments on 
the units it owned. In addition, some owners 
in the complex who were also members of the 
association filed another action against First 
Security. 
tion of the Utah Revised Uniform Limited Part-
nership Act, the West Temple defendants have 
no liability for the various claims of the plain-
tiff. 
On this appeal, the Association has not addressed 
any issue raised by this holding except as it may 
relate generally to whether the district court 
erred in denying the Association's rule 56(f) mo-
tion for continuance, discussed below. Issues 
not briefed by an appellant are deemed waived 
and abandoned. Ptxton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 809 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah.Ct.App.1991). 
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[1] In May 1989, the Association and 
First Security entered into a "Settlement 
Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims" 
(the Release), The Release states that First 
Security denied liability for the past due 
assessments and had its own claims and off-
sets against the Association, The Release 
also provides: 
WHEREAS, the Association did not as-
sert other claims in [its action], but is 
willing to release all other claims against 
Lenders it may have which arise out of or 
relate to the acquisition, foreclosure, man-
agement* control supervision or owner-
ship by Lenders of the American Towers 
project from its inception to the present 
2. The Association, by authority of its 
Board of Trustees and exercising all of the 
powers of the Association vested in it by 
law, the Articles of Incorporation, By-
Laws, and Declaration of Condominium, 
does hereby release, acquit, and forever 
discharge Lenders and their respective 
agents, employees, affiliates, successors 
and assigns from all claims asserted in and 
arising out of [the action], . . . and from all 
other claims, actions, causes of action, 
and/or damages against Lenders which 
arise out of or relate to the acquisition, 
foreclosure, management, supervision, op-
eration or control by Lenders, 
(Emphasis added.) Under the Release, First 
Security and American Savings paid $100,000 
to the Association, $51,807.20 of which was 
provided by First Security. The parties to 
the Release verified that they had consulted 
with legal counsel and were authorized to 
enter into the agreement. 
The district court found that in consider-
ation of the Release, First Security "paid 
significant consideration, gave up valuable 
counterclaims, and provided a release of 
claims against the Association." The court 
concluded that the Release was unambigu-
ous, was fully enforceable, and covered the 
claims made in the Association's complaint 
The Association points out that the release 
lacks an "all-inclusive phrase such as 'all 
6. As further evidence that there was not a mutual 
mistake of fact, the court found that an individu-
al who had worked on the complex as a First 
claims of any nature'" and does not mention 
"First Security's involvement in the construc-
tion and marketing of the project." Thus, 
the Association contends that the Release 
does not encompass the claims the Associa-
tion now asserts against First Security. We 
disagree. 
The agreement broadly releases uall other 
claims, actions, causes of action, and/or dam-
ages against Lenders which arise out of or 
relate to the acquisition, foreclosure, manage-
ment, supervision, operation or control by 
Lenders." (Emphasis added.) The Associa-
tion's brief asserts: 
When First Security took title to the pro-
ject its role as construction lender ceased 
and it became the successor owner/devel-
oper. First Security then completed con-
struction and sold or leased its property. 
These are the activities which give rise to 
the present claims against First Security. 
The Association's claims in this case "arise 
out of or relate to [First Security's] acquisi-
tion, foreclosure, management, supervision, 
operation or control" of the complex. More 
specifically, First Security's role in coordinat-
ing the completion of the construction and 
marketing of the units for sale "arose out of 
and "related to" its roles in managing, super-
vising, and operating the complex. We con-
clude that the Release unambiguously applies 
to the Association's claims against First Se-
curity. 
[2] The Association argues that mutual 
mistake allows it to avoid the Release even if 
the Release covers First Security's potential 
liability for the construction deficiencies. 
The district court rejected this argument, 
concluding that due to "a sustained level of 
expense for mechanical and plumbing repairs 
for several years prior to 1989 . . . the prob-
lems with the American Towers buildings 
after 1989 were at most the ^unknown conse-
quences of a known injury.'" Furthermore, 
the court found that there was no evidence 
that the parties were mistaken about any fact 
at the time they entered into the Release.6 
We agree. 
Security employee later became the Association's 
manager, providing the Association with knowl-
edge of First Security's role in the complex's 
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v. Kingsford, 557 P.2d 1005 larly, "[t]his Court will not nullify a settle-
ment contract because one of the parties 
would have acted differently if all the future 
outcomes had been known at the time of the 
agreement" Blackhurst v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985). 
In Carter 
(Utah 1976), the plaintiff suffered a neck 
injury resulting from a car accident She 
signed a general release for $3,334.09. 
u[S]he was aware of the injury, believing it 
was merely a severe neck strain, but was 
unaware of the nature or extent of her inju-
ry." Id. at 1006. After signing the release, 
she developed numbness in her arm and 
eventually required neck surgery. She then 
sued, seeking to avoid her release. This 
court distinguished between "'an unknown 
iiyury and the unknown consequences of a 
known injury* where the former ,can be the 
basis of a mutual mistake, while the latter 
would be only a mistake of opinion.'" Id. 
(quoting Reynolds v. Merrill, 23 Utah 2d 155, 
460 P.2d 323 (1969)). The court concluded 
that the release banred the action because 
the complications constituted "an unknown 
consequence of a known injury." Id. 
The Association asserts that because the 
damages now claimed were "unknown at the 
time of the release, the parties could not 
have intended the release to cover the dam-
age." The record indicates that from 1985 
through 1990, the Association incurred aver-
age annual expenses of approximately 
$3,100 for repairs to the complex's mechani-
cal and plumbing systems. While repair 
costs later jumped significantly,7 presumably 
the Association could have sued First Secu-
rity for alleged defects leading to then-com-
pleted repairs. The Release indicates that 
in consideration of First Security's payment, 
the Association "did not assert other claims" 
that it had against First Security and re-
leased First Security from liability for all of 
the various roles it had played in financing 
and developing the complex. 
A party may not rely upon mistake to 
avoid an agreement when "he is aware, at the 
time the contract is made, that he has only 
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to 
which the mistake relates but treats his limit-
ed knowledge as sufficient" Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 154(b) (1981). Simi-
acquisition and foreclosure. However, we find it 
unnecessary to discuss this holding. 
7. The Association's 1991 repair bill was over 
$22,000 and its 1992 repair bill was over $44,-
000. These increases are attributable, at least in 
Because the Association had a sustained 
level of plumbing and mechanical problems 
prior to 1989, we cannot say that the prob-
lems now claimed were "unknown" when the 
parties signed the broad release. The Re-
lease clearly demonstrates the Association's 
intent to hold First Security blameless for its 
activities related to the complex. This is 
especially true in this setting, where complex 
claims were negotiated between parties so-
phisticated in commercial transactions, Cf. 
In re Dow Co. Sarobond Prod. Lidb. Litig., 
660 F,Supp, 270, 275 (D.Colo,1987) (noting 
that personal injury cases are more suscepti-
ble to being set aside). We conclude that the 
district court correctly granted summary 
judgment to First Security. 
THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY 
[3] The district court held that the Asso-
ciation's "breach of contract/warranty claim 
fails as a matter of law because plaintiff had 
no privity with the contracting parties and 
was not an intended beneficiary of any of the 
contracts alleged." The Association admits 
that it was not a direct party to any of the 
construction contracts with defendants and 
that there was no express language in the 
contracts establishing an intent to confer a 
special benefit on the Association.8 Instead 
it argues that its status as a third-party 
beneficiary is a question of fact because all 
the parties to the contracts "understood 
[that] the true beneficiaries of the contract 
performances would be the ultimate owners 
of the condominium units" and because "[t]he 
true intent of the parties may not be as 
professed in the contract." 
part, to the complex's increase in unit ownership 
approaching full occupancy. 
8. In the general contractor contract, no such 
provision is present. In the subcontracts, third-
party beneficiary status is expressly denied. 
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Whether a third-party beneficiary status 
exists is determined by examining a written 
contract The issue can be decided on sum-
mary judgment as a question of law, and this 
court has frequently affirmed those legal de-
terminations on review for correctness. See, 
e.g., Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, 
Inc. v. Blvmquist> 773 P.2d 1382, 1385-S6 
(Utah 1989); Wasatch Bank v. Surety Ins. 
Co., 703 P.2d 298,300 (Utah 1985). 
The trial court correctly determined that 
the claim must fail as a matter of law. To 
have enforceable rights under the construc-
tion contracts, the Association had to estab-
lish that it was an intended beneficiary of 
one or more of those contracts. Ron Case 
Roofing, 773 PJ2d at 1386. "The intent of 
the contracting parties to confer a separate 
and distinct benefit must be clear." Id "A 
third party who benefits only incidentally 
from the performance of a contract has no 
right to recover under that contract." 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 
527, 537 (Utah 1993). The Association failed 
to meet its burden of establishing the requi-
site intent. 
Utah courts have not specifically ad-
dressed whether a subsequent condominium 
purchaser or owners association can assert a 
third-party beneficiary claim against the gen-
eral contractor and its subcontractors under 
their construction contracts. However, 
courts that have examined this issue have 
denied third-party beneficiary status. 
In Lake Placid Chub v. Elizabethtown 
Builders, Inc., 131 AJD.2d 159, 521 N.Y.S^d 
165 (1987), a condominium owners association 
brought suit against the builder and the ar-
chitect of the condominiums for breach of 
contract and negligence. After noting that 
the plaintiff had failed to submit any lan-
guage from the contract demonstrating an 
intent to confer rights of performance on the 
ultimate owners of the units, the court stat-
ed: 
Indeed, there is nothing whatsoever in the 
record to suggest that the developer had in 
mind anything but the normal business 
motive to obtain a construction product of 
sufficient quality for ready marketability of 
the condominium units to potential custom-
ers. Such a motive is clearly not a basis 
from which to infer the requisite intent of 
the developer to bestow performance bene-
fits upon the purchasers of the condomini-
um units, let alone their successors. 
Id. 521 N.Y.S.2d at 166 (emphasis addedT 
Likewise, in 155 Harbor Drive Condomini-
um Ass'n v. Harbor Point, Inc., 209 111. 
App.3d 631, 154 IU.Dec. 365, 568 N.E.2d 365 
(1991), the court affirmed the dismissal of the 
plaintiff association's third-party beneficiary 
claim, stating: 
With respect to construction contracts . . . 
"[i]t is not enough that the parties to the 
contract know, expect or even intend that 
others will benefit from the construction of 
the building in that they will be users of it. 
The contract must be undertaken for the 
plaintiffs direct benefit and the contract 
itself must affirmatively make this inten-
tion clear." 
There is no question that the parties 
were aware that the building was being 
built for subsequent purchasers. Howev-
er, "[i]t is not enough that the parties 
know, expect or even intend that" such 
people may benefit or that they are re-
ferred to in the contract. 
Id. 154 IU.Dec. at 374-75, 568 N.E 2d at 374-
75 (quoting Waterford Condominium v. 
Dunbar Corp., 104 Ill.App.3d 371, 60 IU.Dec. 
110, 432 N.E.2d 1009 (1982)). 
We conclude that the district court proper-
ly granted summary judgment on the third-
party beneficiary claim against defendants. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
[4] The Association's complaint also al-
leges that defendants negligently failed "to 
design, construct, supervise and/or inspect 
the construction, and/or supply materials for 
the construction of the Property." As a re-
sult, the Association alleges that it incurred 
"substantial and ongoing reparation costs, 
the substantial diminution of the value of the 
Property and other special and consequential 
damages to be proven at trial." The district 
court held that this claim "fails as a matter of 
law because the alleged damages are for 
economic loss, not for injury to persons or 
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other properly." The Association contends 
that the court erred in its holding and en-
courages us to overturn two court of appeals 
opinions, Maack v. Resource Design & Con-
strudixm, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah.CtApp. 
1994), and Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 PM 
1384 (Utah.Ct-App.1994), "to the extent they 
bar tort claims for the recovery of foresee-
able economic losses in this context." Be-
cause these are questions of law, we do not 
grant the district court's ruling any defer-
ence. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231,235 (Utah 1993). 
In Maack, the court of appeals explained: 
The "economic loss rule" is the majority 
position that one may not recover "eco-
nomic" losses under a theory of non-inten-
tional tort East River Steamship Corp. v. 
Transamerka Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
866-75, 106 S.Ct. 2295, 2300-04, 90 
L.Ed^d 865 (1986); accord Lempke v. Da-
genais, 130 N.H. 782, 547 A.2d 290, 296 
(1988) ("It is clear that the majority of 
courts do not allow economic loss recovery 
in tort, but that economic loss is recovera-
ble in contract."). Economic loss is de-
fined as: 
"[D]amages for inadequate value, costs 
of repair and replacement of the defec-
tive product, or consequent loss of prof-
its—without any claim of personal injury 
or damage to other property . . . as well 
as 'the diminution in the value of the 
product because it is inferior in quality 
and does not work for the general pur-
poses for which it was manufactured and 
sold/" 
Maack, 875 P.2d at 579^80 (quoting ftSU 
Lincoln Park W. Condominium v. Mann, 
Gin, Ebel & Frazwr, Ltd., 136 IU.2d 302, 144 
HLDec. 227, 229, 555 N.E.2d 346, 348 (1990) 
(other citations omitted)). In other words, 
economic damages are not recoverable in 
negligence absent physical property damage 
or bodily injury. Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. 
9. Justice Maughan wrote the lead opinion, in 
which Justice Wilkins concurred. Justices Stew-
art and Crockett concurred in the result only-
Justice Hall dissented from that portion of the 
lead opinion dealing with recovery for negli-
gence 
FrizzeU Architects, Inc., 609 So.2d 1349^1352 
(Fla.DistCtJVpp.1992). 
In Maack, a builder sold a home to a 
buyer. Soon thereafter, the buyer resold the 
home to a second buyer. When the home 
developed water leaks, the second buyer 
sued the home builder for negligent design 
and construction., 875 P2d at 573, The 
court of appeals upheld the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment for the home builder, 
noting the "Intrinsic differences between tort 
and contract law." Id. at 580. The court 
concluded that recovery for deficiencies in 
the quality of construction " 'must be defined 
by reference to that which the parties have 
agreed upon/" Id. (quoting Crowder v. 
Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 
1978)). Under similar facts in Schafir, 879 
P.2d at 1388, the court of appeals again held 
that a plaintiff "cannot recover . . . economic 
losses under a theory of negligent construc-
tion." 
The Association argues that these court of 
appeals decisions conflict with this court's 
plurality opinion in W.R.H., Inc. v. Economy 
Builders Supply, 633 P.2d 42 (Utah 1981).9 
In that case, a purchaser of plywood siding 
sued the manufacturer when the siding dela-
minated following installation. The plaintiff 
alleged that the "negligent manufacture" of 
the siding resulted in damages to him. Id. at 
43. The lead opinion determined that the 
plaintiff had stated a cause of action: "[T]he 
statement that 'purely economic interests are 
not entitled to protection against mere negli-
gence' . . . is inapplicable in situations such 
as the present where the alleged defective 
manufacture results in the deterioration of 
the product." Id. at 44 (emphasis added). 
W.R.H. has not been followed in subse-
quent cases. Instead, it has been distin-
guished as a case that addressed only the 
negligent manufacturing of a product. See 
Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy 
Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1279, 1286 (Utah 1982) (limit-
ing W.R.H. to negligent manufacturing of 
product);10 Maack, 875 P.2d at 581 (W.R.H. 
10. Justice Hall, who dissented in W.R.H. on the 
ground that purely economic interests are not 
recoverable in tort, authored the unanimous 
opinion in Paul Mueller Co. in which he conclud-
ed that two subcontractors were not liable in tort 
for negligently manufacturing and installing 
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"not controlling" because it involved "negli-
gent manufacture" of product rather than 
"negligent construction" of building); Scha-
fir, 879 P.2d at 1388 (same); see also Perry 
v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 PJJd 
214, 217-18 n. 3 (Utah 1984) (this court has 
never blended tort and contract concepts to 
allow products liability for purely economic 
injuries)- Here, the Association alleges neg-
ligent design and construction of improve-
ments to real property, not the negligent 
manufacturing of a product Thus we con-
clude that W.R.H. does not apply to this 
case. 
The policy reasons supporting the econom-
ic loss rule are sound. When a product does 
not perform or last as long as the consumer 
thinks it should, the claim pertains to the 
quality of the product as measured by the 
buyer's and user's expectations—expecta-
tions which emanate solely from the pur-
chase transaction. Thus, contract principles 
resolve issues when the product does not 
meet the user's expectations, while tort prin-
ciples resolve issues when the product is 
unsafe to person or property.11 
The Association argues that applying the 
economic loss rule in construction cases re-
wards builders who construct defective hous-
ing and wrongly focuses on the consequences 
of the defective activity instead of on the 
activity itself. We disagree. Builders who 
construct low quality housing that does not 
cause injury to persons or property may still 
be held liable for damages, but that liability 
should be defined by the contract between 
the parties. The law of torts imposes no 
standards on the parties' performance of the 
contract; the only standards are those 
agreed upon by the parties. Tort law is 
concerned only with the safety of a product 
or an action. See Maack, 875 P.2d at 580; 
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 CaL2d 9, 45 
dairy equipment 657 P.2d at 1286; see also Salt 
Lake City Corp. v. Rosier Corp., 855 F.Supp. 1560, 
1570 (D.Utah 1994) (noting that Paul Mueller Co. 
"stricdy limited the holding in W.R.H to its 
particular facts"). 
11. A plaintiff may, however, recover purely eco-
nomic losses in cases involving intentional torts, 
CaLRptr. 17, 23, 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965). 
Otherwise, the extension of tort law would 
result in "liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an inde-
terminate class." UUramares Corp. "**. 
Tvwche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441, 444 
(1931); see also East River Steamship Corp. 
z?. Transamerica Delaval Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 
871, 106 S.Ct 2295, 2302, 90 L.Ed.2d 865, 
876-77 (1986) (noting need to keep products 
liability and contract law in separate spheres 
and to maintain realistic limitation on dam-
ages). 
These rationales are particularly applicable 
to claims of negligent .construction. Con-
struction projects are characterized by de-
tailed and comprehensive contracts that form 
the foundation of the industry's operations. 
Contracting parties are free to adjust their 
respective obligations to satisfy their mutual 
expectations. See W. Page Keeton et al., 
Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 92, 
at 659 n.15 (5th ed. 1984) ("[Generally . . .
 a 
contractor's liability for economic loss is fixed 
by the terms of his contract."). For exam-
ple, a developer can contract for low-grade 
materials that meet only minimum require-
ments of the building code. When the devel-
oper sells those units, a buyer should not be 
able to turn around and sue the builder for 
the poor quality of construction. Presum-
ably the buyer received what he paid for or 
he can bring a contract claim against his 
seller. See Keeton, § 101, at 708 (nondan-
gerous product "cannot be so poor in quality 
as to be unworthy of sale if the price is 
right"). Meanwhile, if the developer has a 
problem with the builder, he too will have a 
contract remedy. A buyer can avoid eco-
nomic loss resulting from defective construc-
tion by obtaining a thorough inspection of the 
property prior to purchase and then by ei-
ther obtaining insurance or by negotiating a 
warranty or reduction in price to reflect the 
e.g., fraud, business disparagement, intentional 
interference with contract, etc. See W. Page 
Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of 
Torts § 101, at 708 (5th ed. 1984) ("Historically 
. . . the only tort action available to a disappoint-
ed purchaser suffering intangible commercial 
loss has been the tort action of deceit for 
fraud ") 
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risk of any liidden defects.12 See Casa Clara 
Condominium Ass'n v. Charley Toppino & 
Sons, Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 1247 (Fla.1993). 
[5] Next, the Association contends that 
the economic loss doctrine should not apply 
because it suffered damages to property oth-
er than the product itself. Maack defined 
economic loss as " '[d]amages for inadequate 
value, costs, of repair and replacement of the 
defective product, or consequent loss of prof-
its—without any claim of personal injury or 
damage to other property.'1" 875 P.2d at 580 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). The 
Association alleges that as a result of the 
leaking pipes, its members suffered damage 
to walls, wall coverings, carpeting, wall hang-
ings, curtains, and other furnishings. 
This argument fails because in this case 
the "property" was the entire complex itself 
that was constructed as an integrated unit 
under one general contract. In Casa Clara 
Condominium Ass'n, 620 So.2d at 1244, a 
condominium owners association brought a 
negligence claim against a concrete supplier 
for damages to repair defective concrete. 
After explaining the distinction between tort 
recoveries for physical injuries and con-
tractAvarranty recovery for economic loss, 
the court addressed the owners' argument 
that the concrete had damaged "other" prop-
erty. The court rejected the argument, stat-
ing: 
These homeowners bought finished prod-
ucts—dwellings—not the individual compo-
nents of those dwellings. They bargained 
for the finished products, not their various 
components. The concrete became an in-
tegral part of the finished product and, 
thus, did not injure "other" property. 
Id at 15147. 
Similarly, in Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Or-
ling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 236 Va. 419, 
374 S.EM 55 (1988), homeowners filed a 
negligence action against their architects and 
builders after their swimming pool settled, 
causing damage to the pool, the water lines, 
and the home's foundation. The court con-
12. The condominium buyer may inspect the 
common areas and mechanical services of the 
complex by contacting the owners association 
whose duty is to maintain and operate those 
areas and services 
eluded that the claim was barred by the 
economic loss rule: 
The plaintiffs here allege nothing more 
than disappointed economic expectations. 
They contracted with a builder for the 
purchase of a package. The package in-
cluded land, design services, and construc-
tion of a dwelling. The package also in-
cluded a foundation for the dwelling, a 
pool, and a pool enclosure. The package is 
alleged to have been defective—one or 
more of its component parts was sufficient-
ly substandard as to cause damage to oth-
er parts. The effect of the failure of the 
substandard parts to meet the bargained-
for level of quality was to cause a diminu-
tion in the value of the whole, measured by 
the cost of repair. This is a purely eco-
nomic loss, for which the law of contracts 
provides the sole remedy. 
M374S.E.2dat58. 
These cases are applicable here. The As-
sociation contends that the complex's plumb-
ing and mechanical systems do not meet 
their expectations, resulting in a diminution 
in value of their purchase measured by the 
cost of repair. This deterioration of the 
complex does not qualify for the "damage to 
other property" exception to the economic 
loss doctrine. See East River Steamship, 
476 U.S. at 870-71, 106 S.Ct. at 2302 (eco-
nomic loss doctrine bars claim that negli-
gently designed and manufactured turbines 
malfunctioned and damaged themselves, re-
sulting in repair costs and loss of income). 
This interpretation is consistent with the 
court of appeals' decisions applying the eco-
nomic loss rule in Maack, 875 P.2d at 573, 
and Schafir, 879 P.2d at 1386, where the 
plaintiffs claimed that construction defects 
caused water leakage into other parts of 
their homes. 
The Association further contends that the 
economic loss rule should not apply to design 
professionals, although it fails to explain why 
this group is distinguishable from construc-
tion defendants.13 The plaintiff in Maack 
13. Although defendants argue that this issue was 
not raised below and has been waived, we find 
that the Association did provide sufficient argu-
ment and citations to the trial court to preserve 
the issue on appeal 
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alleged "negligent design and construction." 
875 P.2d at 573 (emphasis added). Although 
the court of appeals did not analyze the claim 
of negligent design separately, it concluded 
that "Maack's claims for purely economic 
damages based upon allegations of negligent 
design and construction must fail." Id at 
581 (emphasis added). Further, the court in 
Maack based its adoption of the economic 
loss rule in part on an Illinois Supreme Court 
decision that applied the doctrine to bar neg-
ligent design and supervision claims against 
a design professional. See i/L at 580 (citing 
281b Lincoln Park West Condominium 
Ass'n> 144 IlLDec. 227, 555 N.E.2d at 348); 
see also Atherton Condominium Bd v. 
Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wash.2d 506, 799 P.2d 
250, 262 (1990) (en banc) (economic loss doc-
trine bar to owners association's negligence 
claim involving architect). 
The Association relies upon Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A, which provides: 
One who undertakes . . . to render ser-
vices to another which he should recognize 
as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability 
to the third person for physical harm re-
sulting from his failure to exercise reason-
able care 
(Emphasis added.) This section does not 
strengthen the Association's position. The 
comments following the section underscore 
that its scope is limited to claims for "physi-
cal harm" to persons or property, neither of 
which is present here.14 See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A cmt. b (1965). 
In sum, the Association's negligence claim 
pertains solely to its members' unmet expec-
tations regarding the quality of their pur-
chases, i.e., cumulatively, the entire complex, 
including its plumbing and mechanical sys-
tems. As one court explained: 
Plaintiff homeowners faced with losses 
that are not of their own making present[ 1 
a sympathetic case We must exercise 
caution, however, that we do not unduly 
upset the law upon which expectations are 
built and business is conducted. 
14. Although various elements of the condomini-
ums themselves were damaged, property damage 
was not present for the purposes of the Restate-
ment in that no damage resulted to other proper-
Stuart v. ColdweU Banker Commercial 
Group, Inc., 109 Wash.2d 406, 745 P.2d 1284, 
1290 (1987). To allow the claim would be to 
impose the members' economic expectations 
upon parties whom the members dM not 
know and with whom they did not deal and 
upon contracts to which they were not a 
party. We agree with the trial court's con-
clusion that no cause of action for negligence 
exists under these circumstances. 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
[6] The Association additionally asserted 
a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The 
district court held that the claim "fails as a 
matter of law because (a) the subject matter 
of the claim was pre-empted by the existence 
of express contracts; (b) plaintiff conferred 
no benefit upon defendants; and (c) any en-
richment of defendants was not unjust be-
cause it was the consideration bargained for 
under express contracts." We agree. 
" 'Unjust enrichment of a person occurs 
when he has and retains money or benefits 
which in justice and equity belong to anoth-
er ' " Commercial Fixtures & Furnish-
ings, Inc. v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773, 776 (Utah 
1977) (quoting Baugh v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 
184 PJ2d 335, 337 (1947)). We have held: 
Three elements must be present before 
unjust enrichment may serve as a basis of 
recovery: 
[TJhere must be (1) a benefit conferred 
on one person by another; (2) an appre-
ciation or knowledge by the conferee of 
the benefit; and (3) the acceptance or 
retention by the conferee of the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it 
inequitable for the conferee to retain the 
benefit without payment of its value. 
Concrete Prods. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 734 
P.2d 910, 911 (Utah 1987) (quoting Berrett v. 
Stevens, 690 P.2d 553, 557 (Utah 1984)). In 
other words, the remedy is one of restitution 
designed to restore to a plaintiff a benefit 
unjustly enjoyed by a defendant Commer-
cial Fixtures, 564 P.2d at 776. 
ty, separate and distinct from the condominiums. 
See Maack, 875 P.2d at 580, and Economic Loss 
discussion above. 
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[7,8] The doctrine is designed to provide 
an equitable remedy where one does not 
exist at law. In other words, if a legal 
remedy is available, such as breach of an 
express contract, the law will not imply the 
equitable remedy of unjust enrichment 
Mann v. American Western Life Ins. Co., 
586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978) ("Recovery in 
quasi contract is not available where there is 
an express contract covering the subject mat-
ter of the litigation."); Davies v. Olson, 746 
P.2d 264, 268 (Utah.CtApp.1987) ("Recovery 
under quantum meruit presupposes that no 
enforceable written or oral contract exists."). 
In this case, each defendant is party to a 
construction contract which addresses the 
specific subject matter of the Association's 
unjust enrichment claim. The contracting 
parties were apparently satisfied with each 
other's performance because they each paid 
the contract price and accepted the work 
performed as meeting their contract terms. 
The Association, a stranger to these con-
tracts, cannot now demand that defendants 
adjust the contract price by complaining that 
defendants were unjustly enriched. See 
Knight u Post, 748 P.2d 1097,1101 (Utah.Ct 
App.1988) (denying quantum meruit claim 
against nonparty to construction contract). 
The district court's other conclusions re-
garding this claim are also correct. The 
Association did not confer any benefit upon 
any of the defendants and therefore cannot 
claim that defendants have been unjustly 
enriched. Any enrichment received by de-
fendants was not to the detriment of the As-
sociation because it did not pay any of the 
consideration which defendants received un-
der their1 contracts. Finally, defendants' re-
tention of the benefits under their construc-
tion contracts was not unjust Defendants 
all provided services and materials in ex-
change for their contract price. That value 
was accepted as sufficient and appropriate. 
We conclude as a matter of law that the 
construction defendants were not unjustly 
enriched. 
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF 
HABITABILITY 
[9] The Association further asserted an 
implied warranty of habitability claim. The 
district court held that this claim "fails as a 
matter of law because the defendants were 
not lessors of residential rental units, and 
Utah does not recognize such legal claims." 
The Association concedes that Utahylaw does 
not recognize such an action in the context of 
residential sales but urges this court to ex-
tend the law to this area. 
In Wade v. Jobe, 818 PM 1006 {Utah 
1991), this court held that a landlord of 
leased residential property may be liable for 
breach of an implied warranty of habitability. 
We reasoned that such a warranty is neces-
sary because tenants lack the skill, means, 
and bargaining power to ensure the habita-
bility of leased premises. Id at 1010. How-
ever, we have not extended such a warranty 
to purchasers of residential property. 
In Maack, the court of appeals explained: 
The main policy reasons behind extend-
ing an implied warranty of habitability to 
residential leases are the unequal bargain-
ing position of the parties and the prospec-
tive tenant's limited ability to inspect and 
repair the property. These policy reasons 
are not present to the same degree in the 
purchase of residential property. The 
purchaser has the right to inspect the 
house before the purchase as thoroughly 
as that individual desires, and to condition 
purchase of the house upon a satisfactory 
inspection report. Further, if there are 
particular concerns about a home, the par-
ties can contract for an express written 
warranty from the seller. Finally, if there 
are material latent defects of which the 
seller was aware, the buyer may have a 
cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the 
circumstances presented to the purchaser 
of a residence are not closely analogous to 
those of a relatively powerless lessee 
875 P.2d at 582-83 (emphasis added). 
The Association contends that Maack is 
distinguishable because the plaintiff was "an 
experienced attorney" who "conceded that a 
reasonable inspection of the home at the time 
of the purchase would have revealed all the 
alleged defects." We disagree and find that 
the reasoning in Maack is sound. The terms 
of a contract for the sale of a residence are 
much more open to negotiation than a rental 
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contract because the buyer and seller have 
similar bargaining power. If the seller re-
fuses to accede to an express warranty, noth-
ing prevents the buyer from halting negotia-
tions and looking elsewhere. Tenants often 
do not have that luxury and are more prone 
to take what they can ge t 
The Association contends that condomini-
um purchasers are especially susceptible to 
latent defects and do not have a feasible 
opportunity to conduct ,an inspection. We 
disagree. The condominium buyer, like the 
home buyer, is investing in the ownership of 
a residence rather than making rental pay-
ments for a transient dwelling. The buyer 
has the incentive and the means to inspect 
the unit before purchase. As noted in the 
economic loss section above, a condominium 
homeowners' association typically oversees 
the management, maintenance, and operation 
of the units. The potential buyer can contact 
this association, which is equipped to know 
of, respond to, and guard against defects in 
the complex. We are unconvinced that a 
condominium buyer is analogous to "a rela-
tively powerless lessee." Accordingly, we af-
firm the district court's denial of this claim. 
BLOCK ASSOCIATES, INC. 
[10] All of the defendants in this action 
except Block Associates, Inc. (BAI), respond-
ed to the Association's second amended com-
plaint and were eventually granted summary 
judgment. Consequently, the Association 
filed a motion for entry of default judgment 
and an affidavit of its expert witness ostensi-
bly establishing damages against BAI in the 
amount of $10.23 million. The district court 
directed entry of BAI's default but denied 
the request for a money judgment, holding 
that granting one "would be inconsistent with 
the law of this case as determined by this 
Court's rulings on plaintiffs claims against 
the other defendants." 
We recently explained the law-of-the-case 
doctrine in Thurston v. Box Elder County, 
892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995): 
[A] court is justified in refusing to recon-
sider matters it resolved in a prior ruling 
in the same case for reasons of efficiency 
and consistency The doctrine is not a 
limit on power but, "as applied to the effect 
of previous orders on the later action of 
the court rendering them in the same case, 
merely expresses the practice of courts 
generally to refuse to reopen what has 
been decided." It rests on " 'good sense* 
and the desire to protect both court and 
parties against the burdens of repeated 
reargument by indefatigable diehards.'" 
Id. at 1038-39 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted). 
BAI had originally functioned as the corpo-
rate general partner of Block 58 Associates, 
one of the defendants that already had been 
granted summary judgment BAI had be-
come defunct and \^as involuntarily dissolved 
by the Department of Commerce on Septem-
ber 1? 1989, two years before this action was 
originally filed. For the district court to 
have ruled as the Association requested 
would have created diametrically opposed 
and inconsistent judgments in this case. 
"Defendant's failure to answer and ensuing 
default . . . require the. court to accept the 
factual allegations as true, but the court 
[should] enter judgment as requested only if 
it determined those facts established an ac-
tionable claim." Stevens v. CoUard, 837 
P.2d 593, 596 n. 5 (Utah.CtApp.1992) (em-
phasis added). Were the rule otherwise, a 
court could be obligated to enter a money 
judgment on a complaint as frivolous as a 
refusal to share recipes with a neighbor. Id. 
Thus the court must determine whether an 
actionable claim exists. 
The district court declined to enter a mul-
timillion dollar default judgment in favor of 
the Association in view of its previous rulings 
finding that the claims failed as a matter of 
law. We find no error. 
DENIAL OF MOTION TO CONTINUE 
DISCOVERY 
Beginning in May 1994, most of the defen-
dants filed motions for summary judgment. 
In response, the Association moved for a 
continuance under rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, on which motion 
the court apparently did not rule. In July 
1994, the Association filed a second rule 56(f) 
motion. The Association asserted that one 
AMERICAN TOWERS OWNERS v. CCI MECHANICAL 
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year (since the filing of its second amended sought damages for unjust 
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complaint) was an insufficient period to con-
duct discovery given the size and complexity 
of the case. More specifically, it stated that 
it needed more time to examine (1) when 
certain statutes of limitations began to run, 
(2) the intent of the parties on its third-party 
beneficiary 'claim, (3) "the parties' undis-
closed knowledge of the defects of the pro-
ject," and (4) the relationships and agree-
ments of the various parties. 
[11] The district court conducted a hear-
ing in August 1994, denied the Association's 
rule 56(f) motion, and granted all of the 
summary judgment motions. The Associa-
tion argues that the court erred in denying 
its motion to continue discovery. 
Rule 56(f) provides: 
Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion [for summary 
judgment] that he cannot . . . present . . . 
facts essential to justify his opposition, the 
court may refuse the application for judg-
ment and may order a continuance to per-
mit affidavits to be taken or depositions to 
be taken or discovery to be had or may 
make such other order as is just. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f). We review a trial 
court's decision to grant or deny a motion 
under this rule under the abuse of discretion 
standard. Crossland Sav. v. Hatch 877 P.2d 
1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). While a party's rule 
56(f) request is to be liberally considered, 
such motions may be properly denied where 
they are found to be 'lacking in merit" Id.; 
Jones v. Bountiful City Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 
561 (Ufaih.CtApp.1992) (trial court should 
not grant rule 56(f) motion to protect party 
from merits of motion for summary judg-
ment). In Jones, the court rejected a rule 
56(f) motion where, even if the facts the 
plaintiff believed would be discovered were 
actually borne out, they would not have been 
legally relevant to the narrow issue before 
the court on summary judgment. 834 P.2d 
at 562. 
[12] The holding in Jones applies here. 
The Association's second amended complaint 
15. The district court also held that the Associa-
tion's claims were barred by the applicable stat-
utes of limitations and that the ' 'discovery rule" 
did not apply to toll the running of the statute of 
enrichment, 
breach of contracVwarranty (third-party ben-
eficiary), negligence, and breach of implied 
warranty. We have affirmed the district 
court's holding that each of these "four claims 
fails as a matter of law. In addition, we have 
held that First Security was released from 
these claims and that the Association was not 
entitled to a money judgment against Block 
Associates, Inc. These two conclusions were 
also matters of law. As in Jones, the facts 
that the Association seeks to discover would 
not be legally relevant to the resolution of 
these issues. See also Callioux v. Progres-
sive Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 838, 841 (Utah.<XApp. 
1987) (movant "must explain how the contin-
uance will aid his opposition to summary 
judgment," and additional discovery request-
ed must be "material and of a substantial 
nature"). We conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
Association's motion to continue discovery.15 
We affirm the district court's grant of sum-
mary judgment to each of the defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and DURHAM, J., 
and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Court of 
Appeals Judge, concur. 
Having disqualified himself, RUSSON, J., 
does not participate herein; PAMELA T. 
GREENWOOD, Court of Appeals Judge, sat 
STEWART, Associate C.J., does not 
participate herein. 
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limitations. However, in light of our holdings on 
the other issues in this case barring the Associa-
tion's claims, we determine that it is unnecessary 
to reach these issues 
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« ' • ' • • i . . • ' ' • - -
Due in full upon resale of units, or 1 year, whichever first occurs, 
Possession of said prcmiaca. shall be delivered to buyer on the ' ' t n dAy 0f D e c e m b e r ^ ; I Q 7 9 
i«h 4.' Said monthly payments are to be upplied first to the payment of interest and second to the reduction of ;tho 
;;'!; principal. Interest'shall- l^(a^X^HiX1?l-»fflX-riat. hP .chtVCQQd -j.
 : on all unpaid portions'of the". 
\\ \ purchase price a t the rate of. i flQ per cent ( riOfle—^l^)»por'ahnum. The Buyer, at his option at/anytime, 
'
 4I may pay amounts in excess of the monthly payments upon the unpaid balance subject to the limitations of any mortgage 
•5. i or contract by the Euynr herein assumed, ciich oiccaa to be applied either .to unpaid principal or in prepayment oJj future 
J'jj! installments at tha'election of the buyer,, which election must bo made ut the time the oxcesj payment is made. 7 •• ' \\ 
: ] 5. It is understood and agreed that if the Seller accepts payment from the Buyer on thin contract less thariaccording ' 
I. j to the terms herein' mentioned, then by so doing, it will in no way alter, the terms of the contract as to tho forfeiture 
j \ hereinafter stipulated, or oa to any other remedies of the uullor. . .';..;.. !"*:V 
j. j G. It ia understood that ' there presently exists an obligation against said property' In favor.of -!'; - : •"'•• .- •'•• _ 
Prndential, Federal Savings & Loan — — with ah unpaid .balanceof 
•'" '. ., • . , . . . . ., a s o f -
i 
ii 
I/! 
jj'J hereinafter designated on the Buyer, of — _ _ — — f'l-j 
1. THIS AGREEMENT, made In duplicate this I Z t l l day of . D e c e m b e r ,
 t ^ D m 79 ,. m 
by and between ^ _ ^ m i t M l i l i J I l , J L M ^ n ? ^ P ! f j 
hereinafter designated an the Seller, and llEJM\RfOMI.f&QN : : |«j!j 
; f4 
lift .' 2. WITNESSETH: That ' the S«llor, for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to sell and convey to thebuye r , }*j< 
i?j!r and the buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to purchase the following described real property,si tuate in . }!;!] 
i :-# the county of SlilOTllii: . , State of Utah, to-wit: . . • . " - • \':ij 
j Aooneca •'• 
< ".; More particularly described aa follows: 
f'! Unit 26, SNOW FLOWER CONDOMINIUMS, together with a 1.18% undivided ownership/in - .V-
jJ the common areas .nnd facilities, and Unit 40, SNOW FLOWER CONDOMINIUMS, together " j?|lj 
iiig with a ].56% undivided ownership 1n the commonareas and facilities, according to '* 
pi the Condominium Declaration and Record of Survey. Map recorded September 25#i197S.-. 
jj:j as Entry Nos. 149678 and 149679, respectively,, in the office of the SummitlCounty 
);!i| Recorder. 
ill;: TOGETHER with furniture package in units. 
'. . 3. Said Buyer Iwcby agrees to cn^ «»* into possession and nay for said described prciniaes^the sum of ONE HUNDRED 
ffjj frlBTV> FTVR- THnfT^A^^ ..QBE. HTTNfnREI) .TOTWTY-FOrrft- AKA 4 7 / T O f i — ^ z r x ^ r D o l i a r a . ( j i ^ ^ 4 J 4 2 ' ) 
ij-i payable at the office-of Setf'cry.his assigns-or order : L j L ^ _ — ^ — ,l<- -:•'••:
 v
:
 ' -
:
 ' •'. 
.. . • . . , • . . - . • • " . • J ? . - * - - , 1 " - * ' ' ? : ; { - t 
7. Seller represents that there are no unpaid special improvement district'taxes covering improvements;to^ saio\'prem- ! 
i^cs now in the process of beintr installed, or which have been completed and not paid for, outstanding against said Ptbp-
•"' • - ' • • * ' - ' * ' ' • v » r t r » # - » : " * ' ' ' ' ' " * '**' ' i •>• k ' " " " • ' I * ^ - • • ' '•'*•* %:' 
erty, except:the followin,gc...,;. •- DSLuy ' .; • : : ; : • ' - •• * - -v- • "• • <1>. . - o •• •.-._..** 
8. The, Seller is'grven the option to secure, execute and maintain loans secured by said, property of not^'exccWTithe ".' 
then unpaid contract balance here under, bearing interest at the rate of tiot to e x c e e d s : ••••'• • > ?, '^- . ' -V^pVtj . . .^^: 
( j fo) per annum and payable in regular monthly-installments; provided, that the ^(rregate^.monthly^iMtal^enc • 
,.,., payments required to be made by Seller on said loans shall not be greater than each installment;payment-remiirejiJioije..'•<••• 
Cj. made by the Duycr. under, thia contract When the principal due hereunder haa been reduced ito the amount of any sucht • 
j;'i loans and mortgages :tho Seller, agrees to convoy and tho Buyer acteesjrto accept title to the above described proper ty; . . 
M> subject to. said loans end mortgages. , .' • . !. v-;> • • •.., > "'. '.*•''".<•?'.'•' 
,v| 9. If the Buyer desires to exurciuo hia right through accelerated payments unde r this agreement to payvoff -any/obji* :. 
V j gntions outstanding at date of this agreement against said property, .'it shall be the Buyer's obligation tovassume and : {.} pay any penalty which ;may;.be required on prepayment of said prioi; obligations. Prepayment- penalties^ in respect 
i]j to obligations against said ^ property incurred by seller, after date-of this agreement, shall be paid by seller unless' K 
t'lf said obligations- oi*o ssnumcd or. approved by buyer. * r J : ' . y . , . ^ ^ •"•..- , ; ; . s.-*- •'••>> -M'I • &i,'i#;-*A':>. 
ftr| 10. The.Buyer agrees upon written request of the Seller to make application to a reliable lender for a loan' of such 
amount as can bii secured under- the regulations of said lender and hereby agrees to apply any amount uo received .upoa^i 
tho .purchase price above juondoned, and to execute tho papci*o reo.uirod and pay one-half. tha e^rpensas Jieeeasary. in ob- ".• 
tehung saidr loan, t h e Seller agreeing to pay the other onerhalf, nrovidetl however, that thu; monthly, payments and 
interest rate required, shall not exceed the monthly payments and"interest rate as outlined abevo.. .-.,«« "' :,, ;"••-. . 
; 11. Tha Buyer agrees to-pay.all taxes and assessments of every kin.I and nature which are or which may be. assessed 
and which'may -ueeoiua due on tlicse premises during tho life of this agreement. The Seller'-hcrcby covenants and;agTeea 
that there.arc no afinecsmeuta. cgaim;i said premises oxcept the following: ' "; -. 
The Seller further covenants and agrees that he will not default ir* the payment of his obligations against said property. 
a t ! ; -
- W : T v -.-*=-: 
-.- .----^^ . -:_, S ^ ^ ^ i j p . 
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12. Tho Buyer cgrcca to pay the general taxes after D e c e m b e r 17 ^ 1 9 7 9 ' 
13* The Buyer further agrees to keep all insurable buildings and improvements on said premises insured in a com-
pany eceaptahla to the Caller in the amount of not leaa tl\an tho unpaid balanco on thia contract, or $~ 
and to ocaigii taia iiiaoranco to tho Seller*.as. hia intcroats may appear and to doHvcr tfio insurance, policy to-him:" 
14. l a ' t h a c»?ent the Buyer chall default in the payment of any special or goncral ta-cns,\aaacaanienta or insurance 
premiums aa heroin provided, the Poller may, a t hia option, pay naid tares , oanoaamenta and innurauca premiums or either 
of them,, and if Seller electa no to do, then tine Buyer agrees to repay the Sailer upon demand, .all such-cuma oo advanced 
and paid by him, together v/ith interest thereon from date of payment of oaid cuma at tho rntd of & of ono percent per 
month until pr.ld. • . • ' ; : . . . ' : . . . ' > ' % 
15. Buyer agrcoa that he will not commit or suffer to bo committed any waste, cpoii, or destruction in or upon 
said promises, and that ha will maintain naid* premises in good condition. v. ,«>*. ,. ;."•••• 
16. In the event or" a failure to comply with tho tonus hereof by tho Buyer, or upon failure^of tlio Buyer to inako 
am* payuicnt or payivionta when the came nhall became due, or tvi'thm - 3 P 
Seller, at" hia option nhall have <he following alternative remedies: 
. days thereafter, tho 
A. • Collar uh.v.l have the right, upsn failure of tha Buyer to remedy tha default within five "daya after written notice, 
• .• >• fco-iw rciaasad irotn all ublitrntions ia to,u' and in equity to convey Gaid property, and. all payments which have 
been ui;.;Je theretofore on thi.i contract b y t h o Buyer, shall ha f o r f e i t ! to tho Boiler aa liquidated damages for 
the Ko;i-pariArmancc of tho. contract, and the Buyer agrees tliat the Seller may a t hia optica re-enter and take 
pc.Voc:.'33 of nnid pivtninca withoutJcral processes aa in ito fi»*nt and former estate, together with all improve-
tavkita and additions made by the Buyer thereon, and tho oaid additions and improvements shall remain with 
tha . b a d become tho property oi the Seller, tho Buyer becoming at once a tenant a t will of the Seller; or 
B. The Sailer may bring suit nud rccovar judgment for all delinquent installments, including casta and attorneys 
A-oa. \The use of thia remedy on one or more occaniona ohall not prevent tlio Seller, a t hia option, from resorting 
to one of the other remedies hereunder in the event of a subsequent default): or • l \ > • .. • ., .. • 
C. Viie Seller shall have the right, at hia option, and upon .written hotJco to the Duyor,' to declare tha entire unpaid 
bal&irc here under a t oneo due and payable, and may elect to t reat thia contract aa a note and 'mortgage, and pasa 
title to u>a lluyor cuiojcci thereto, and proceed immediately to foreclose tha came in accordance with the laws of 
tlio iitate of Utah, and have the propany cold and the procaada applied to tha payment of the balance owin^, 
iwc3i!«v.f4:j coata end attai-ne;/^ foca; u*id the Seller may liave a judgment for any aYsiicicncy xrhich may remain. 
In tho «w-o of fovocloGUio, tho Seller hereunder, upon the filintr of a complaint, ohall bo immediately entitled to . 
tho np;v>intm?nt of a itsroivcr to toko pofwesaion of caid mor<^ *nrr<»d property nnd collect tlio ront3, iaauca and 
profit:} thevoivom and apply tho came to tho payment of. the obligation hcreuudor, or hold the same pursuant 
to ovil^r o\ the «.o\u*t: and the GcUo.v, upon entry of jud(5mcnt of foreclosure, nUaii be. entitled to the poaaeaaion 
ov the raid premises during the period of redemption. • *.'..". ' ,- ' r 
17. I t to njjrccd that time ia the ossenco of thia agreement. '"' '']' '' \ 
1-$. In the event tliare arc any licna or oncumbrancea ne-ainat oaid prcmiaca other than those herein, provided for, or 
referred to, or ia the event any Kalis or encuuihrancca other than herein provided for ohall hereafter accrue against tho 
same by acta or n^stect of the Seller,'tlian tlie Buyer may, at hia option, pay and diocharge tho aanio and receive credit 
on Uia axr.nunt then- remaining duo hereunder in the amount of any aucrv payment or payments and thereafter thej»ay-
menta hci-ein provided to ho mode, may, at the option of tho Buyer, be auoponded until such ' t ime, as .such auapended 
. paymenta ahal! equal any aums advanced as aforesaid. i : ? 
19. 'rbe toiler on receiving the payments herein reacrved to be paid a t tho time and in the manner above montioncd 
crr^ecs to cracuta and deliver to the Buyer or ac3i#n3, a good and sufficient warranty deed conveying the title to tho 
cbovc c'cr-'U'iL'ed prcmiaea free and clear of all encumhranco3 except as herein mentioned and except aa may have accrued 
hy or through ilia acta or neglect of tho Buyer, and to furniah a t hia expenao, a policy of title insurance in the amount 
of the purchnr-a price or a t the option oi the Seller, an obatract brought to dato at time of aalo or at any time during tho 
term of thia agreement, or at time of delivery of deed, at tho option of Buyer. 
20. I t in hornhy cxproaaly underatood and agreed by the partica hereto that tho Buyer accepts the said property . 
in ita preacnt condition and that thcro are no ropreacntationa, covenants, or agreements between tho partica hereto ..with 
reference to naid property except as herein specifically act forth or attached hereto , LJ: * 
\ nonn: , • 
21. Tho Duyer and Seller each agree that should they default in any ot tho covenants or agreements contained hens 
in, tha t Hia defaulting party nhall pay all coatu and expenaau, including a reasonable nttornoy'o fee, Vnich may arise 
or accrue from enforcing tin's agreement, or in obtaining posntiasion of tho promiaea covered hereby, or in pursuing any 
remedy provided hereunder or by tho statutes oi the Stato ot Utah whether such remedy ia pursued by films a suit 
or othcrvvinc. 
22; I t ia understood that tho cumulations nforcaaid are to apply to and bind tho heira, oxocutoro, administrators, auc-
ocasora, and ansi^ns of the respective ivarties hei-cto. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said j>artic3 to thia agreement havo hei^eunto oigned their names, tho day and year 
first above writ-tan. 
Signed, in U\o prosencp of 
*£i) L^fed^u^-MMi^. 
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WHEN RECORDER MAIL TO: 
Jon C. Heaton, Esq. 
Prince, Yoates & Geldzahler 
455 South Third East Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 34111 
CONDOMINIUM DECLARATION 
FOR SNOW FLOWER CONDOMINIUMS 
THIS DECLARATION is made on the date hereinafter set forth by SNOW 
FLOWER, LTD., a limited partnership ("DECLARANT"). ^ 
CM 
UJ 
CD 
ARTICLE I <£ 
CL. 
RECITALS O 
(M 
A. Declarant4s the owner of certain real property located in Summit ^ £ 
CD 
County, Utah, a legal description ot which is attached hereto as Exhibit A O 
CD 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
B . Declarant has improved said real property by coastructing thereon 
a condominium project in accordance with the plans and drawings set forth 
in the Record of Survey Map filed concurrently herewith, consisting Of Z 
sheets, prepared by J ,J . Johnson & Associates, Engineers and Surveyors, 
and certified by James G, Wes,t, a registered land surveyor. Said cottdo* 
minium project shall be known as Snow Flower Condominiums. Declaraitt 
intends to establish said condominium project under and pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah Condominium Ownership Act. 
C. The aforesUted condominium project shall contain S2 condominium 
uni ts . The Declarant, by this Declaration, hereby establishes a plan for 
the ownership of teal property estates whereby the o*vner of each such unit 
Entry No. J L & t & Z y Book JklJJL.O. 
RECORDED &*>£:J!2 IWJQ&A Pagef?.73f-
REQUEST of 5 Lun/n^~C%.J£$£~.m 3*U. 
FEE WANOA Y. SPfttGGS, SUMMII CO, JtfCORniF 
\.£&£CL_ By yka^jbfcjj 
INDEXED _ ABSTRACT £ _ 
AKTICLE Hi 
APPLICXBILITY OF ACT 
It is the intention of Declarant that the provisions of the Act shall 
apply to the Condooinium Project and that the provisions of this Declaration 
shall be construed1 in accordance therewith. 
as 
ARTICLE IV J ^ 
CM 
DESCRIPTION OF THE CONDOMINIUM PROJECT ^ 
1* LOCATION: The Condominium Project is located on certain real ,~j 
property located in Summit County, Utah, as more particularly described w*t 
in Exhibit A hereto,. Q 
O 
2. DESCRIPTION Or IMPROVEMENTS: The two buildings and other CQ 
structures and improvements which constitute the Condominium Project were 
constructed by Declarant in accordance with specifications contained in the 
Map, Said buildings contain a total of 82 units and are of frame construc-
tion. Units contained therein are either of studio type design or contain 
one, two, three on four bedrooms. Each Unit has a dishwasher, fireplace 
and whirlpool type;soaking tub. All Units arc totaUy electric as to heating 
and appliances. Electricity is separately metered to each Unit. Each Unit 
has a separate electric water heater. 
3 . DESCRIPTION AND LEGAL STATUS OF UNITS: Both the Map 
and the schedule attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein 
by this reference show the Unit number of each Unit and each Unit's respec-
tive location. Each Unit shall include that part of the building containing 
the Unit which lies within the boundaries of the Unit, which boundary shall 
be determined in the following manner: the upper boundary shall be the 
plane""of the lower surface of the ceiling; the lower boundary shall be the 
plane of the upper surface of the floor; and the vertical boundaries of the 
6-
4. OWNERSHIP Or COMMON AREAS AND FACILITIES: The Common 
Areas and Facilities shall be o^ned by the Unit Owners as tenants in com-
mon. The percentage of undn mod ownership mterest in the Common Areas . } 
and Facilities which is aopurtenant to each Unit, as set torch in Exhibit C *^* 
hereto, has been computed bv determining the ratio between the square ~ ! 
feet of floor space contained in such Unit and the aggregate square footage ^ 
of all Units in the Condomium Project (with such minor adjustments in some ^ 
or all of the resulting percentage interests as may have been necessary to ^ ^ 
CD 
assure that the total undivided interest respecting the Coadominium Project <—** 
CD 
equals 100%). The Common Areas and Facilities shall remain undivided. 
No Unit owner or any other person shall bring < ay action for partition or 
division of any par t thereof, unless the Property has been removed from 
the provisions of trie Act, as so provided in the Act. 
ARTICLE IX 
VOTING - MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP 
1. MEMBERSHIP: Each Unit Owner shall automatically, upon becom-
ing' the Owner'of same, be a member of the Association of Owners, and 
shall remain a member thereof until such time as his ownership ceases for 
any reason, at which time his membership in the Asscciation of Owners 
shall automatically cease. Membership shall be in accordance with the By-
laws of the Association of Owners. 
2. TRANSFERRED MEMBERSHIP: Membership in the Association of 
Owners shajl not be transferred, pledged, or alienated m any way, except 
upon the sale or encumbrance of the Unit to which it is appur tenant , ajid 
then only to the purchaser (m the case of a sale) or mortgagee (in the 
case of an encumbrance) of such Unit. Any attempt to make a prohibited 
transfer is void. In the event any Unit Owner should fail or refuse to 
transfer the membership registered in his name to the purchaser of his 
-12-
ditionu to be determined by the Management Cguuniiiro iu its sole discretion. . ^ 
The instrument of .convcy.mee :.h;iH be signed by two nieialu.-rs of the Man- »<v 
U? 
agement Committee., whoso signatures shall be sufficient to convey all of ^jrj 
*=£ the r ight , title an!d interest of the Unit Owners in and to the Manager's Cu 
CD 
Unit, each Unit Owner hereby appointing the then members of the Manage- r \J 
H 
ment Committee as his attorneys-in-fact to execute, such instrument on his £g 
behalf. The proceeds of the sale shall be applied first to pay all outstand- CD 
CD 
ing assessments and charges against and accrued expenses of the Manager's OQ 
Unit, then to pay the expenses of preparing the Unit for sale and selling 
it# with the balance, if any, remaining either applied against common ex-
penses, placed in a suitable reserve or distributed among the Unit Owners 
in proportion to their ownership interest in the Manager's Unit (the deter-
mination of the foregoing being within the sole discretion of the Management 
Committee). 
ARTICLE XXXIII 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
This Declaration shall'take effect upon recordation. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned has 'caused this Declaration 
to be executed on its behalf this \ 4 A- day of Ht)6nrs~T 1978. 
SNOW FLOWER, LTD., 
a limited par tnership, 
By: Jack W. Davis, I nc . , 
(General Partner) 
k W. Davis, President 
YsttrvZO 
- 4 1 -
STATE OF CAL^FO^NIA 
COUNTY OF SAN DltiGO 
On this 14 th day of AUGUST , 1978, pei i.onally appeared 
before me JACl{ W« DAVIS , ^ho , bejng by me first duly 
sworn, did declare that he is the PRESIDENT of Jack W. Davis, 
Inc . , a general partner of Snow riowci , Ltd , that he SJgned the foregoing 
document as such PRESIDENT of the corporation, that said 
/instrument was signed on behalf of and by authority of Jack W Davis, I n c , 
and said HE aclcnowledged to me that he executed 
the same* 
K\ 
U J 
CD 
<C 
O-
o 
CD 
CD 
CO 
OFFICIAL 
Cynthia Ann] 
NOTARY MJ81IC 
iseysforagszszggs 
SEAL 
Gootiiich 
CAUfORNIA 
PMNCItAl Off«C£ IN 
SAN OIEOO JCOUNIY W 
paary Public 
Residing at 
tori. C y n t h i a Ann Goodr ich 
San Diego County 
.S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a 
My commission expires. September 26 , 1980 
- 4 2 -
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^ Ay— WEST OUAUTtA < 
a y » stcnoN • 
ER secnoH ** J 
SURVEYORS CERTIFICATE 
I, Jamee «. W H I , I A»«M«(M Utah L«*4 Surveyor beldlee. CertlfUota U»ee»ee > Number SOU «e 
hereby Certify rh«t I h»*e Surveyed »M W I W I M deetribed Troet ef L«ntf 
•eei<vtfn« of a petat •••"* M.ISS N t and teet t» «S feet fre« the S«ith«eet »^»-r e* Seetiee • . 
TownoMp t South, Mn«e 4 Coat, Salt U k i Idee ond Meridian, and ruiwtlee theoee North 0*l(rtO 
Coot soc St footfall* Southerly noht-of-way Mm of snw Kin* Drivei thenee North w e U " 
Coot alone. Mid Southerly noht-ef-woy KM 141 SOS foett theoee South IO*0«'Cw( 1ST TO feet; Ihefw* 
south 74*te' wee* TS.TT teet, I M M South t**s«< *••» tot so u$it tuenee sou* • • • • O ' we»t U U I 
feeti " » * • • fbwfh 4«400 Weet ItOOO feet fa the point ef koatantaf Contain* S.STO aero* 
«f-«ey the ef Sliver Kind Drive, thenot Norm SOM0,14*Eo«t S0 4« feet alone *dld Southerly rlaht-
•f-woy U M , th*M4 South 0*18 t o V e t f SOS 02 feet, thenot North 40*Weet 42.2S foot,!**"** North 
0*lVioMEeet 0 2 t T f M t to tMpelnteftedinAino. Cotltolna 0 ISSaaf** 
f further eertWy that the iMv« deeortetlen accurately deeoriba* the land eertaoe upon «rhie*> N I * M « 
SoowfWor CondomlnkiiM I* accordance with the Utah Condominium OwnereNp Act I further certify 
that the reference Mrkcrt •» ahewn en tMt plat era located e» otiewft.and aufflelentte readily 
rotreee er re •eerablleh tide eurvey 
. 7^«ra t(,117a 
-kz A. <*-ztr 
MORTGAGEES CERTIFICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD , 
t « WM««tor,ll*veeetmybo»d>t"»- £ £ dey e t ^ ^ W & V ^ 
)\M P f Y S P M F M T <— / ACKNOWLEDGEMENT / 
COUNTY OF ) " * 'J ~ „ _ _ j 
' ^ J T T * ^ ^ SS*t.*fwUl*i( / _ _ 0 f etvtfwtlel *«dtr«J S«v<n««eA4 Leej; A»»</«leT»eii,« 
••liw'duty twerti <H»«y that the irtlh* e«4 ter*«Hn4 Monngee* OvtlfkattoWCodeent Ti» I^Heort «r«jj«l 
- * £ -
hehelf H »dl4 eoreeretloo «n4 that *4leeoreer>irtc 
My Oewwiieelee C«*«ret 
OWNERS CERTIFICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD 
# OAVIS, PRESlOCNT 
W DAVIS, INC,end JACK W DAVIS INC,«««*NE«At PAtrTMERef 
>wnjQ»hCW LTD.ACelif LmMi»< fermereWp SHEET Of 8 
PARK CITY APPROVAL 
« Sec tlort «T - ^ - 3 9 ( 3 ) of _ 
ATTEST 
1ST* me Clfy «f Pork Cltye bedy 
iklMlltyM wMthrfHSNDwnjOWCRl 
<vel te «el4 ereieet, »e''-
A *l .... -^p W | 
nMoo 
CONOOMNIL/WS It lo<4tee,hereby «*m final eperi 
dec aro HA retarded eortoJrrertt/V herewltfi.tothe i 
oonuift ef 3 Meeti e^d to fti« ohrlbufei of Mid 0 
omiBium 
lOpter IT 
Pk*K t . . . 
protect wflieti 
Cond n OwnertNp A«t M 
h 19TS Oio erl S Settle* l i 
t>AffK CITY 
^ A I . I . ^ A U ^ , . 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
BE IT BEMEMBCREO Ofl thle XSLinvt m.tf***.—sn}*f p*tmt*Ut 
appeared before me.fhe undertlaned Notary Mbll«/3»el( W Oevle «rho belna by 
" - • • " — * •<»" -» - li the preeldent at Jack* Dovli.lne.,«eneml Partner 
My CemmUlon Etwree 
—y-» ' , <trr 
Irk*.* 
z: 
ISNOW FLOWER CONDOMINIUMS 
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